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INTRODUCTION
American government in the twentieth century has witnessed the
arrival of the administrative state. Legislatures still make law by enact-
ing statutes, and courts still apply law by deciding cases, but a vast
array of administrative agencies now also exercise important lawmak-
ing and adjudicatory functions.' As the Maryland Court of Appeals
acknowledged nearly thirty years ago, agencies "have come to legislate
more than legislatures and to adjudicate more than courts." 2 Agen-
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B., Princeton University;
MA, University of Washington; LL.B., Harvard University. The author would like to thank
his colleagues, Bill Reynolds and Greg Young, for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this Article.
1. The nondelegation doctrine, at least in theory, bars the legislature from delegating
its lawmaking powers, but agency rulemaking is permissible if the statute authorizing
agency action states an "intelligible principle"-that is, if the statute provides "sufficient
legislative guidelines to limit adequately the exercise of discretion by administrative offi-
cials." Department of Transp. v. Armacost (Armacost II), 532 A.2d 1056, 1062 (Md. 1987).
Given the lack of vigor characterizing the Court of Appeals's enforcement of these vague
standards, it is disingenuous to deny that agencies exercise lawmaking powers, at least
within whatever limits the legislature prescribes. See Falik v. Prince George's Hosp. & Med.
Ctr., 588 A.2d 324, 328 (Md. 1991) (stating that "the modern tendency of the courts is
toward greater liberality in permitting grants of discretion to administrative officials" (cit-
ing Sullivan v. Board of License Comm'rs, 442 A.2d 558, 563 (Md. 1982))).
2. State Ins. Comm'r v. National Bureau of Cas. Underwriters, 236 A.2d 282, 286 (Md.
1967). Chief Judge Hammond's opinion for the court in National Bureau recognized the
validity of lawmaking and adjudication by administrative agencies, effectively giving agen-
cies the court's constitutional seal of approval. See Edward A Tomlinson, Constitutional
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cies exercise those functions only within limits set by the legislature
and the courts; thus, an agency can only make law if given statutory
authority to do so, and most agency action is reviewable by the courts.
Those salutory checks on agency action prevent agencies from abus-
ing their powers.
Agency lawmaking and adjudication raise basic questions of legiti-
macy. As an arm of the executive branch, agency regulators lack the
legitimacy that legislators acquire through popular election and that
judges acquire through the independence and institutional traditions
of the courts. This legitimacy deficit frustrates the ability of agencies
to obtain popular acceptance as lawmakers and adjudicators, rather
than as meddlesome bureaucrats. Popular acceptance is important
because, in many areas affecting day-to-day life, the controlling law is
likely to be an administrative regulation rather than a statute, and the
application of that law to individuals is likely to occur before an ad-
ministrative agency rather than a court.
Administrative Procedure Acts (APAs) help agencies overcome
this legitimacy deficit. No doubt they often appear burdensome to
agencies subject to their provisions, but in return for the burdens im-
posed, APAs reward agencies with increased legitimacy. APAs provide
legitimacy in at least three ways: (1) they require transparency by af-
fording public access to agency law and records; (2) they ensure pro-
cedural regularity when agencies make or apply law; and (3) they
provide judicial review to persons adversely affected by agency action.
By promoting the values of transparency, procedural regularity, and
judicial review, APAs enhance the legitimacy of the administrative
state and, one hopes, improve the quality of agency decisionmaking.
The federal and state APAs adopt a general or comprehensive
approach to further these values; they cover all agencies in the juris-
diction except those specifically exempted by statute.3 As a result, a
lack of fit may sometimes exist between APA requirements and the
sensible administration of a particular agency program. Despite this
concern, APAs normally mandate uniformity in procedural matters
unless an agency makes a sufficiently strong case to the legislature for
an explicit exemption.4 This approach reflects ajudgment, supported
by long experience, that without minimum procedural safeguards,
Limits on the Decisional Powers of Courts and Administrative Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REv.
414, 419-23 (1976) (discussing National Bureau).
3. See infra notes 51, 99; see also infra text accompanying note 9.
4. See Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REv.
297, 303 (1986).
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agencies will give inadequate protection to private interests in the pur-
suit of efficient, effective, and economical government.5
Maryland enacted its Administrative Procedure Act in 1957.6 The
original statute was a fairly barebones affair, but its thirteen brief arti-
cles established the basic framework that remains in place today.7
Through its definition of "agency," the 1957 Act applied to "any State
board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make
rules or to adjudicate contested cases."' Specifically exempted were
agencies within the legislative or judicial branches and five named ex-
ecutive branch agencies: the Department of Parole and Probation,
the State Industrial Accident Commission, the Public Service Commis-
sion, the Employment Security Board, and the State Tax Commis-
sion.9 For the remaining covered agencies, the Act prescribed
procedures for two types of proceedings: rulemaking procedures for
the adoption of rules' ° and adjudicatory procedures for deciding con-
tested cases." This basic dichotomy between rulemaking and adjudi-
cation followed the approach found in the Federal APA and
anticipated that of the 1961 Model State APA.12
Maryland's 1957 APA, like its federal and state counterparts, em-
bodied the values of transparency, procedural regularity, and judicial
review. To ensure transparency, the Act required the Secretary of
State to compile, index, and publish all agency rules then in effect
5. See id. at 303-08. Given their general character, APAs should only apply to those
situations where the benefits of uniformity outweigh the need for diversity. See id. at 305.
6. Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 94, 1957 Md. Laws 124 (originally codi-
fied at MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 244-256 (1957)). The Maryland Administrative Proce-
dure Act now appears in title 10 of the State Government Article. MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T §§ 1-101 to -305 (1995).
Maryland based its 1957 APA on the Model State APA adopted in 1946 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Conference revised its 1946
Act in 1961. The 1961 Model State APA, however, largely resembles the 1946 Act. MODEL
STATE ADMIN. PROC. AcT OF 1961, 15 U.LA 137 (1990) [hereinafter 1961 MSAPA]. The
Conference lists Maryland among the 28jurisdictions adopting the 1961 Act 15 U.LA 20
tbl. (Supp. 1996).
Congress adopted the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
7. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 1-101 to -305.
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 244(a).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 245. Rulemaking procedures are now codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T §§ 10-101 to -139.
11. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, §§ 251-254. Contested case procedures are now codified at
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOVT §§ 10-201 to -227.
12. See 1961 MSAPA, supra note 6; Bonfield, supra note 4, at 308-09 (discussing states'
and model APAs' emulation of the Federal APA).
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and to publish the text of all rules subsequently adopted.'" To ensure
procedural regularity, the Act prescribed agency procedures for
adopting rules and adjudicating contested cases. 14 To ensure the
availability of judicial review, the Act authorized two types of chal-
lenges to agency action. First, one could petition a circuit court for a
declaratory judgment to determine the validity of a rule if it appeared
"that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs,
or threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges
of the petitioner."' 5 Second, a "party aggrieved" by a final decision in
a contested case could petition the circuit court for review.' 6 These
two provisions reflect the dichotomy in the Act between rulemaking
and adjudication; the scope of review is quite different if the chal-
lenged agency action is a rule rather than a final decision in a con-
tested case.' 7 Indeed, the court's function in determining the validity
of a rule is so narrow that it may be inappropriate to describe it as
"judicial review."'"
Subsequent amendments built on the 1957 Act's basic framework
to advance the values of transparency, procedural regularity, and judi-
cial review. The 1974 State Documents Law' assured greater trans-
parency and procedural regularity in rulemaking by creating the
Maryland Register and the Code of Maryland Regulations
(COMAR).° By mandating a uniform format for reporting all agency
rulemaking activity in two centralized publications, the Act provides
the public with ready access to the text of proposed, adopted, and
13. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 247(a)-(b).
14. Id. § 245 (rulemaking); §§ 251-254 (contested cases).
15. Id. § 249(a). Section 249 now appears at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-125.
The only changes are stylistic.
16. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255(a) (now codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T
§ 10-222).
17. See infra notes 79-84, 125-130 and accompanying text.
18. The statutory provision authorizing declaratory judgment actions to determine the
validity of agency regulations, unlike the provision governingjudicial review of decisions in
contested cases, makes no mention ofjudicial review. MD. CODE ANN., STArE Gov'T § 10-
125.
19. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 600, 1974 Md. Laws 2013 (codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV'T §§ 7-201 to -222).
20. Id. The Maryland Public Information Act, enacted in 1970, also ensured greater
transparency by providing all persons access to nonexempt agency records. Act of May 21,
1970, ch. 698, 1970 Md. Laws 1970 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-611 to -
628). Public information provisions are part of the Federal APA and most state APAs, but
the Maryland legislature has not formally incorporated the Public Information Act into the
APA.
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existing regulations."1 Like their federal counterparts,22 the Maryland
Register publishes notices of proposed and adopted regulations, 3 and
COMAR publishes a compilation of all regulations currently in ef-
fect.2 14 In 1989 the legislature created the Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH) to enhance procedural regularity in adjudication.
The OAH functions as a central administrative court for the adjudica-
tion of contested cases.2 ' Although the APA allows agency heads27 to
retain final decisional authority28 and to conduct contested case hear-
ings,29 agencies may no longer employ their own hearing examiners; °
instead, agencies must use administrative lawjudges (ALJs) employed
by the OAH. 1 The introduction of a centralized hearing office re-
quired further refinement of the statutory provisions relating to con-
tested cases; the legislature adopted the necessary changes in 1993 in
response to the recommendations of the Governor's Commission to
Revise the Administrative Procedure Act (the Tiburzi Commission).32
As Maryland's APA reaches its fortieth anniversary, it has suc-
ceeded in legitimating agency lawmaking and adjudication. The Act
functions reasonably well, and after the major revisions enacted in
1989 and 1993-the latter revisions in response to the recommenda-
tions of a prestigious gubernatorial commission-there is little likeli-
hood that the legislature will tinker further with the Act's text. This
Article, therefore, does not propose to analyze the Act's detailed pro-
visions to determine if further amendments are desirable. Rather, it
21. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 7-205 to -206 (mandating content and format
requirements).
22. See44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1511 (1994) (creating Federal Register and Code of Federal
Regulations and mandating their format and content).
23. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 7-206.
24. Id. § 7-205.
25. Office of Administrative Hearings Act, ch. 788, 1989 Md. Laws 4284 (codified at
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 9-1601 to -1610).
26. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 9-1601(b) (describing applicability of the
OAH); § 10-206 (describing procedures and practice in contested cases).
27. Section 10-202(c) defines "agency head" to mean "an individual or group of indi-
viduals in whom the ultimate legal authority of an agency is vested by any provision of law."
Id. § 10-202(c).
28. Id. § 10-205(b).
29. Id. § 10-205(a) (1).
30. Id. § 9-1601(b).
31. Id. § 10-205(a)(1)(ii)(1). On the OAH's creation and functioning, see generally
John W. Hardwicke, The Central Hearing Agency: Theory and Implementation in Maryland, 14J.
NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 5 (1994).
32. Act of April 13, 1993, ch. 59, 1993 Md. Laws 1017. That law adopted the Commis-
sion's recommendations on adjudication and licensing. See COMMISSION TO REVISE THE
ADMIN. PROC. Acr, INITIAL REPORT ON SUBTITLES 2 AND 4 OF THE APA (1992) [hereinafter
TIBURZI COMMISSION INITIAL REPORT].
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shall use Maryland's experience in implementing the Act to analyze
how Maryland administrative law differs substantially from contempo-
rary federal administrative law and from administrative law as envi-
sioned by the drafters of the 1981 Model State APA.53 In addition, the
Article shall address two basic questions to assess the soundness of the
Act's basic framework.
The first question is the utility of the rulemaking-adjudication di-
chotomy, both generally and as implemented by Maryland's APA.34
The categorization of agency action into rulemaking or adjudication
determines what procedures the agency must provide and the extent
to which aggrieved persons may obtain judicial review. Should so
much depend on a distinction that legislatures and courts find diffi-
cult to draw? The Article concludes that the Act's reliance on the
distinction is reasonable and preferable to a unitary approach. It also
concludes, however, that separation of powers principles do not pre-
clude the legislature from requiring courts to review regulations
under the standards that the APA applies to final decisions in con-
tested cases; the Court of Appeals errs when it suggests or holds
differently.
The second question is the wisdom of recognizing a single proce-
dural model for rulemaking and a single model for adjudication."
Applying the APA's rulemaking and contested case procedures is an
all-or-nothing affair. When an agency adopts a regulation it must fol-
low the rulemaking procedures, and when it adjudicates a contested
case it must follow the contested case procedures. That approach
works reasonably well for rulemaking, even though one might ques-
tion the utility of rulemaking procedures for adopting regulations that
do not have legal effect. Adjudication, however, is less clear-cut. The
statutory definition of a contested case raises difficult interpretive
questions and may cover proceedings for which some procedural ad-
justments are appropriate, such as initial licensings36 In addition,
there appear to be adjudications that are not contested cases.
Although an adjudication found to be a contested case triggers the
full panoply of procedural safeguards and judicial review under the
APA, the situation is quite different for adjudications that are not con-
33. For the text of the 1981 Model State APA, see MoDEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. AcT §§ 1-
101 to 5-205, 15 U.LA 10-136 (1990) [hereinafter 1981 MSAPA]. Only three states (Ari-
zona, New Hampshire, and Washington) have adopted APAs based on the 1981 Model
State APA. 15 U.LA 1 tbl. (Supp. 1996).
34. See discussion infra Part I.C.
35. See discussion infra Parts IRA to flI.C.
36. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(d) (defining a contested case).
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tested cases. The APA assures neither procedural regularity nor judi-
cial review for these cases. Affected parties receive only those
procedures the agency chooses to provide, and they may only access
the courts, absent some other statutory right to review, through the
courts' inherent power to correct illegal, arbitrary, and capricious ad-
ministrative acts." 7 Relegating noncontested cases to the netherworld
of non-APA adjudication deprives them of the APA's legitimating
function. Not all adjudications, however, involve sufficiently impor-
tant interests to warrant contested case treatment. For example, when
a state park ranger revokes a camping permit, the minimal private
interest at stake surely does not warrant contested case treatment and
the accompanying procedural safeguards. Properly interpreted, the
APA does not require that result.
I. RULEMAKING VS. ADJUDICATION IN MARYLAND
Maryland's APA provides two procedural models: one for adopt-
ing regulations 8 and one for adjudicating contested cases. 39 The
models differ sharply in providing for public participation and review
of agency action. Participation in rulemaking is open to everyone, but
limited to the submission of written or oral comments;4 ° judicial re-
view of regulations is also limited, but legislative oversight often pro-
vides a significant review mechanism. 4' In contested cases, however,
aggrieved persons may participate as parties in the equivalent of a civil
bench trial before an ALJ.42 Although legislative review is unavailable,
courts review final decisions in contested cases more intensely than
they do regulations.43 Thus, designating a matter as a contested case
rather than as rulemaking affords an indeterminate class of persons-
those aggrieved by the agency's decision-with increased opportuni-
ties to participate before the agency and to seek relief from the courts.
The Federal APA, by contrast, recognizes at least four procedural
models: formal rulemaking, informal rulemaking, formal adjudica-
37. See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
38. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-101 to -139.
39. Id. §§ 10-201 to -227.
40. Id. § 10-112(a) (3) (ii).
41. See id §§ 10-110 to -111.1 (describing legislative review); § 10-125 (limiting judicial
review of regulations to declaratory judgment actions).
42. See id. §§ 10-207 to -219 (describing procedures for contested cases).
43. Compare id. § 10-125(d) (permitting a reviewing court to strike a regulation only if
ultra vires, unconstitutional, or adopted in violation of procedural requirements for adop-
tion), with id. § 10-222(h) (3) (permitting a court reviewing a decision in a contested case
to reverse or modify for other errors of law, for lack of evidence, or because of the agency's
arbitrary or capricious action).
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tion, and informal adjudication.' Formal or trial-type proceedings
are available only if some other statute requires the agency to make a
rule or adjudicate a case "on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing."45 For those proceedings, the Federal APA, like its
Maryland counterpart, affords parties the equivalent of a civil bench
trial.' If no statute external to the APA requires formal proceedings,
the agency may proceed informally. For informal rulemaking, the
Federal APA specifies the notice and comment procedures that the
agency must follow.47 The Federal APA is largely silent on the proce-
dures that the agency must follow in an informal adjudication, but the
Act's unitary review provisions do subject the agency's decision or or-
der to judicial review.4" Thus, when adjudicating informally, an
agency may adopt whatever procedures it chooses, subject to any re-
strictions found in the United States Constitution or in the agency's
enabling legislation. As a general matter, neither informal notice and
comment procedures nor findings and conclusions are necessary.49
However, the availability of review distinguishes informal adjudication
in the federal system from non-APA adjudication in Maryland. A fed-
eral court cannot perform its reviewing function unless it knows the
reasons for the agency's action. Consequently, as the Supreme Court
explained, the availability of judicial review "imposes a 'general' pro-
44. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1994) (formal rulemaking); § 553 (informal rulemaking);
§§ 554, 556-557 (formal adjudication). For informal adjudication, the Act does not specify
what procedures agencies must follow, but provides for judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
45. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (rulemaking); § 554(a) (adjudication).
46. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557. Formal adjudication is also subject to section 554. In recent
years, formal rulemaking under sections 556 and 557 has largely disappeared as a proce-
dural model. Congress rarely requires agencies to make rules "on the record after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing." See BERNARD ScHwARTz, ADMINiSrRATvE LAW § 4.11, at 192
(3d ed. 1991). The Supreme Court is unwilling to construe other statutory language con-
ferring hearing rights as sufficient to trigger formal proceedings. See, e.g., United States v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 234 (1973) (noting the Court's prior refusal to interpret
the Interstate Commerce Act's mandate that the Interstate Commerce Commission act
"after hearing" as triggering formal rulemaking procedures (citing United States v. Alle-
gheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972))).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 553. That section exempts certain rules from the requirements of infor-
mal rulemaking. For those rules, the applicable procedural model is that of "publication
rulemaking." See infra text accompanying notes 239-242.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("agency action" reviewable); see also id. § 551 (13) (defining "agency
action" to include "order"); § 551(6) (defining "order" to mean the final disposition of an
adjudication). The definitions in sections 551(6) and 551(13) are incorporated into the
Act's judicial review chapter. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (2).
49. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-56 (1990) (con-
cluding that notice and comment procedures are not required for informal adjudication);
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417-20 (1971) (holding that,




cedural requirement of sorts by mandating that an agency take
whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable the
court to evaluate the agency's rationale at the time of decision."50
A. Rulemaking Procedures in Maryland
The rulemaking model requires agencies to follow a legislative-
type notice and comment process whenever they adopt a regulation;
this requirement broadly applies to most all agencies, including those
specifically exempted from the original APA.51 Under this model, po-
tentially interested persons receive notice of a proposed regulation
through the Maryland Register5" and may submit written or oral com-
ments to the agency;53 the comment period lasts at least thirty days,54
and an agency cannot adopt a nonemergency regulation for at least
forty-five days after its initial publication in the Maryland Register.5
To receive oral comments, the agency may either schedule a public
hearing or provide a telephone number that persons may call.56 No-
tice of an adopted regulation must also appear in the Maryland Regis-
ter; that notice must identify any changes in the proposed
regulation 57 and must include, if changes occurred, a certification
from the Attorney General that the text adopted does not differ "sub-
stantively" from the text proposed. 58 Thus, if an agency wishes to
adopt a regulation that differs "substantively" from the proposed regu-
lation, it must first propose the regulation anew and afford a further
opportunity for public comment.59 That approach differs sharply
50. LTV, 496 U.S. at 654. On the importance of the LTVdecision, see I KENNETH CULP
DAVIS & RICHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 8.5, at 394 (3d ed. 1994).
51. The rulemaking procedures apply to every "unit" in "the Executive Branch of the
State government." MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-109 (1995). "Unit" is defined as an
"officer or unit authorized by law to adopt regulations." Id. § 10-101(i). The only execu-
tive branch "units" exempted from the APA's rulemaking procedures are the Injured
Workers' Insurance Fund, a board of license commissioners, and the Forvm for Rural
Maryland. Id. § 10-102(b). Certain bicounty commissions, such as the Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Commission, also have a limited exemption. Id. § 10-105. Finally, there are a
small number of enabling statutes that explicitly exempt agencies from both the rulemak-
ing and contested case subtitles of the APA. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 12-104(h) (2)
(1995) (exempting the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland).
52. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-111(a)(1)(ii).
53. Id. § 10-112(a) (3) (ii).
54. Id. § 10-111(a) (3).
55. Id. § 10-111(a)(1)(ii).
56. Id. § 10-112(a) (3) (ii).
57. Id. § 10-114(b)(1).
58. Id. § 10-113(c).
59. Id. § 10-113(a). The Act defines "substantively" to mean "in a manner substantially
affecting the rights, duties, or obligations of: (1) a member of a regulated group or profes-
sion; or (2) a member of the public." Id. § 10-101(h).
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from federal law, which gives agencies greater flexibility to modify
proposed rules in response to public comment.6' Maryland law, how-
ever, unlike the Federal APA, does not require agencies to explain the
basis and purpose of all adopted rules.6"
Although the opportunities for public participation in rulemak-
ing are fairly limited, the oversight role of the Joint Committee on
Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review (the AELR Commit-
tee) is substantial. Statutorily established in 1974,62 the Committee
functions year-round to review proposed regulations for consistency
with legislative intent.6" The APA requires an agency to submit a pro-
posed regulation to the Committee at least fifteen days before submit-
ting it for publication in the Maryland Register;64 the Committee then
has the authority to delay65 or formally to oppose a regulation's adop-
60. The Federal APA does not explicitly address the issue, but the courts have allowed
federal rulemakers to avoid a second round of notice and comment procedures if the
adopted rule is a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule. See BENJAMIN W. MliNrz & NANCY
G. MILLER, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
RULEMAKING 177-84 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING]; see also, e.g.,
American Med. Ass'n v. United States, 887 F.2d 760, 767 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[A] final rule is
not invalid for lack of adequate notice if the rule finally adopted is 'a logical outgrowth' of
the original proposal." (footnote omitted)). That approach allows agencies to avoid fur-
ther delay if the notice of proposed rulemaking affords adequate notice for the rule ulti-
mately adopted. See FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING, supra, at 178; see also American Med.
Assn, 887 F.2d at 768 ("The crucial issue.., is whether parties affected by a final rule were
put on notice that 'their interests [were] "at stake"'." (citing Spartan Radiocasting Co. v.
FCC, 619 F.2d 314, 321 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d
646, 659 (1st Cir. 1974)))). Although recognizing Maryland law to be more "stringent,"
the Attorney General believes that reproposal is not necessary if the changes do not signifi-
cantly "disadvantage" groups affected by a regulation. 75 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 90-003, 5, 14
(Jan. 22, 1990). To reduce delay, the Tiburzi Commission recommended amending the
APA to create an expedited republication process for making substantive changes in pro-
posed regulations. See COMMISSION TO REVISE THE ADMIN. PROC. ACT, SUPPLEMENTAL RE-
PORT ON SUBTITLE 1 OF THE APA 11-12 (1992) [hereinafter TiBuRzi COMMISSION
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT]. The legislature did not act on that recommendation.
61. The Federal APA explicitly requires that a statement of basis and purpose accom-
pany all adopted rules. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994). The 1981 Model State APA also requires
that an explanatory statement accompany all adopted rules. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33,
§ 3-1 10(a). The Maryland APA contains no such requirement.
62. The AELR Committee was established as part of the State Documents Law of 1974.
See supra note 19.
63. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-111.1(b) (2).
64. Id. § 10-110(b). The Committee may delay a regulation indefinitely unless the
agency notifies the Committee of its intention to adopt the regulation and provides the
Committee an additional period of time (either 30 days or until the seventy-fifth day fol-
lowing the publication of the proposed regulation, whichever is longer) to complete its
review. Id. § 10-111(a)(2)(ii).
65. Id. § 10-111(a) (2).
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tion.66 If the Committee formally opposes a regulation, an agency
may adopt it only with the Governor's approval. 67 Thus, the Commit-
tee does not have full veto power over executive branch rulemaking.
Committee approval, however, is necessary if an agency wishes a pro-
posed regulation to take effect upon publication under the "emer-
gency adoptions" provision.6" An emergency regulation takes effect
on the date specified by the Committee.69 If the Committee imposes
a time limit on the emergency regulation, the agency must adopt it
through normal rulemaking procedures if the regulation is to remain
in effect.70
The AELR Committee, assisted by the Department of Legislative
Reference, 7 reviews roughly five hundred regulations annually.7
While it does not appear that the Committee has ever formally op-
posed a regulation,73 agencies are responsive to the Committee's views
on law and policy. As explained in the Committee's 1992 Annual Re-
port: "It is an understatement to say that the Committee continues to
66. Id. § 10-111.1. The Committee's authority to delay or oppose regulations derives
from 1985 amendments to the APA. Act of May 28, 1985, ch. 783, 1985 Md. Laws 3664.
The prior year, Governor Harry Hughes vetoed a bill authorizing the Committee to sus-
pend a regulation until the following legislative session. See Veto Message of May 29, 1984,
1984 Md. Laws 4092. The Governor contended that the bill violated separation of powers
by infringing on the executive branch and the judiciary. See id. The Committee's lesser
authority under the 1985 legislation is now generally accepted.
67. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-111.1(d).
68. Id. § 10-111 (b). This authority dates from the 1974 State Documents Law. See supra
note 19; see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-110(a) (exempting emergency adop-
tions under section 10-111 (h) from preliminary review).
69. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-117(b).
70. Id. § 10-111(b) (4) (i)-(ii).
71. Id. § 2-505(b).
72. In 1995, the Committee reviewed 87 regulations submitted for emergency adoption
and 445 regulations proposed for adoption within normal time frames (532 total). The
comparable figures for 1994 were 84 emergency and 541 proposed regulations (625 total);
for 1993, there were 69 emergency and 356 proposed regulations (425 total). See ANuAL
REPORT OF THEJONT COMM. ON ADMIN., ExEcuTrvE, AND LEGIS. REVIEw 2 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter 1995 ANNUAL REPORT].
73. Telephone Interview with David M. Sale, Counsel, AELR Committee (Apr. 22,
1996). In late 1994, the Committee decided to oppose a regulation proposed by the Board
of Physical Therapy Examiners in the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. Letter
from Paula C. Hollinger, Presiding Chairman of the AELR Committee, to Senator Clar-
ence W. Blount and Delegate Ronald A. Guns (Dec. 2, 1994) (on file with author). How-
ever, the Department withdrew the regulation before the Committee formally voted to
oppose it. Letter from Charles M. Dilla, Chairman, Board of Physical Therapy Examiners,
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, to Senator John Pica and Delegate John
Amick (Feb. 25, 1995) (on file with author). The regulation had evidently aroused the
opposition of chiropractors, who believed it encroached on their territory. See id.
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be an active partner in the regulatory process."74 No doubt the Com-
mittee is most active in the emergency adoptions process in which its
approval is necessary; it has rejected emergency adoptions in some
cases and held public hearings in others.7 It has also delayed a signif-
icant number of proposed regulations.76 The Committee's primary
input, however, is more informal. As explained by the Committee in
its 1993 Annual Report:
Time after time, an agency's draft would be presented to
us for review prior to publication and, after review for clarity
and compliance with statutory authority, amendments would
be necessary. Again, no hard numbers are available because
of the informal nature of many of the contacts, but the Com-
mittee continues to have input on a substantial number of
proposed regulations.77
Given the Committee's authority to involve the Governor in agency
rulemaking, it is not surprising that agencies usually, but not always,7"
accept the Committee's recommended changes.
Court review of adopted regulations, by contrast, has been quite
modest. The judicial review provisions of the APA do not apply to
regulations, but only to final decisions in contested cases.7 9 The Act's
declaratory judgment section authorizes review of a regulation before
74. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN., EXECUTIVE, AND LEGIS. REVIEW 3
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT].
75. In both 1994 and 1995, the Committee held lengthy public hearings on the Depart-
ment of the Environment's emergency regulations on lead paint. The Committee rejected
the regulations in 1994, but approved them in 1995 after the Department revised them in
response to the Committee's recommendations. See 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 72,
at 3; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN., EXECUTIVE, AND LEGIS. REVIEW 2-3
(1994) [hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL REPORT].
76. The Committee delayed seven proposed regulations in 1992. See 1992 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, supra note 74, at 4-5.
77. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON ADMIN., EXECUTIVE, AND LEGIS. REVIEW 4
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT]. Similar language appears in 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 74, at 3.
78. The Department of Licensing and Regulation adopted a regulation prohibiting
smoking in Maryland workplaces without the changes recommended by the AELR Com-
mittee. See 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 75, at 3-4. The regulation is MD. REGS. CODE
tit. 9, § 12.23 (1995), which the court upheld against various statutory and constitutional
challenges in Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 654 A-2d 449 (Md. 1995). The legislature
subsequently enacted a statute excluding certain locations from the regulation's coverage,
most notably bars, restaurants, and hotel sleeping rooms. See Act of March 27, 1995, ch. 5,
1995 Md. Laws 350 (§ 1 codified at MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 2-105 (Supp. 1995); MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 2-106, 5-314 (Supp. 1995)). See generally Claudia J. Zucker-
man, Note, Reining in the Occupational Health Regulators: The Ban on Smoking in the Workplace,
55 MD. L. REv. 872 (1996) (discussing the legislative history of the smoking ban statute).
79. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222 (1995).
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its application to determine its validity if "the regulation or its
threatened application interferes with or impairs or threatens to inter-
fere with or impair a legal right or privilege" of the person seeking
relief8 ° That section has received little judicial application,"' perhaps
because of the limited scope of the review provided. A court may de-
clare a regulation invalid only if found to be unconstitutional, ultra
vires, or adopted in a procedurally irregular fashion."2 Thus, review is
for legality but not for rationality; the court does not determine
whether substantial evidence supports the regulation or whether the
regulation is arbitrary or capricious.
Rulemaking procedures in Maryland are thus fairly efficient and
not particularly exacting; agencies need not disclose for comment the
factual basis for a proposed regulation, nor need they respond to any
comments received. The courts' role is minimal, but there is consid-
erable legislative oversight. The process closely resembles the original
federal informal rulemaking process. Section 553 of the Federal APA
also mandates a legislative-type notice and comment process for infor-
mal rulemaking; however, unlike the Maryland APA, it allows an
agency to limit interested persons to written submissions.83 During
the Federal APA's first few decades, opportunities for public participa-
tion in agency rulemaking were quite limited, but congressional re-
view of regulations played a significant role in federal rulemaking
until the Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto in 1983.84
80. Id. § 10-125(b).
81. The first reported decision applying it does not even cite it. See Christ v. Maryland
Dep't of Natural Resources, 644 A.2d 34 (Md. 1994) (dismissing a declaratory judgment
action challenging regulation setting a minimum age for power boat operators); see a/so
State v. 91st St.Joint Venture, 625 A.2d 953, 958 (Md. 1993) (per curiam) (discussing the
availability of judicial review of a regulation's validity in a judicial enforcement
proceeding).
82. Section 10-125(d) of the State Government Article instructs the court to declare a
provision of a regulation invalid:
[I]f the court finds that:
1) the provision violates any provision of the United States or Maryland
Constitution;
2) the provision exceeds the statutory authority of the unit; or
3) the unit failed to comply with statutory requirements for adoption of the
provision.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-125(d).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994). The agency has the discretion to permit oral presenta-
tions. Id.
84. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). The Court found that the legislative
veto provision in Chadha, which permitted either house of Congress to overrule the Attor-
ney General's suspension of an alien's deportation, violated the Constitution's require-
ments of presenting legislation to the President for approval, bicameral approval of
legislation, and separation of executive and legislative powers. Id. at 924-25, 952-58. In his
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A major transformation in federal rulemaking commenced in the
late 1960s. Informal notice and comment rulemaking, justly praised
by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis as "one of the greatest inventions of
modem government,"8 5 became "ossified." 6 A process designed to
be fair, simple, and efficient became increasingly costly and time-con-
suming, as all three branches of government imposed additional pro-
cedural and substantive requirements on rulemaking agencies.
Congress, for example, enacted enabling statutes requiring particular
agencies to provide a heightened factual basis for their regulations or
to afford the public additional opportunities to participate in the
rulemaking process.8 7 The executive branch also contributed to the
ossification process. Though not required to do so, many agencies
developed "hybrid" procedures, affording greater opportunities for
the adversarial testing of a proposed rule's factual basis than the
purely paper process required by section 553 of the APA.s s More im-
portantly, the President, acting through the Office of Management
and Budget, assumed major oversight responsibilities for agency
rulemaking. That oversight, mandated by executive order since the
Nixon administration,8 9 forces agencies to evaluate the costs and ben-
efits of major proposed rules and to consider less costly regulatory
alternatives. 90
The judiciary has been the most significant contributor to the os-
sification of federal rulemaking. Starting in the late 1960s, courts, re-
dissent, Justice White asserted that Congress had included a legislative veto in nearly two
hundred statutes enacted during the prior five decades. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
85. KENNETH CuLu DAVIS, ADMINISrRATrrE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (Supp. 1970).
86. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE
LJ. 1385, 1385 (1992). Professor McGarity was the first to use the colorful phrase "ossify"
to describe what had happened to federal rulemaking. See id. For an update on efforts to
deossify federal rulemaking, see RichardJ, Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemak-
ing, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 6(f), 84
Stat. 1590, 1597 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1994)) (providing for substantial
evidence review of rules); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 305(a),
91 Stat. 685, 772-76 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (1994)) (requiring legislative-
type hearing on rules); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act of 1975, Pub. L No. 93-637, § 202(c), 88 Stat. 2183, 2194 (1975) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 57a(c) (2) (B) (1994)) (permitting cross-examination in rulemaking on disputed
issues of material fact).
88. The Administrative Conference of the United States encouraged this development.
SeeACUS Recommendation 72-5, 1 C.F.R. § 305.72-5 (1996). "Hybrid" procedures exceed
the minimum section 553 paper process, but afford less than trial-type process.
89. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 3-16 (1995).




viewing regulations under an arbitrary and capricious standard,
required federal rulemakers to engage in what the judges called "rea-
soned analysis."91 Previously, federal agencies could limit their no-
tices in the Federal Register to a summary of the proposed or adopted
rules' provisions.9 2 Reasoned analysis, however, forced agencies to ex-
pose for adversarial comment the factual basis for a proposed rule and
to respond to the relevant objections of interested persons.93 If an
agency failed to satisfy these new informational and explanatory de-
mands, it ran a grave risk that a reviewing court would find the rule to
be arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, invalid.94 Thus, federal
rulemakers must expend considerable time and effort in building a
record if they expect to produce a rule that will survive judicial review.
The ossification of federal rulemaking reduces the procedural
gap between rulemaking and adjudication. Procedures for the adop-
tion of major rules have become so expensive and protracted that
many agencies understandably strive to minimize their use and even
to substitute adjudication in implementing their statutory mandate. 95
Significantly, Maryland has not experienced a similar development.
Compared with the transformation of the federal rulemaking process,
rulemaking in Maryland has changed little since the adoption of the
State Documents Law96 in 1974. Reviewing courts have not required
reasoned decisionmaking, and the legislature has not imposed "hy-
brid" rulemaking procedures. In 1978, the legislature did require
agencies to publish an economic impact statement with each notice of
91. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57
(1983) (quoting that phrase from Judge Leventhal's well-known opinion in Greater Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)); United States v. Nova Scotia
Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252-53 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring FDA to explain further
the basis for a regulation regarding fish processing); Rodway v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that basis and purpose statement under
section 553 must respond "in a reasoned manner" to comments and must explain how the
agency resolved significant problems raised by the comments); Automotive Parts & Acces-
sories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (requiring that basis and purpose
statement permit a reviewing court to understand the major policy issues in an informal
rulemaking and to see why an agency resolved those issues in a particular fashion).
92. See McGarity, supra note 86, at 1396-97.
93. See Nova Scotia Food Prods., 568 F.2d at 252-53 (finding that agency improperly failed
to expose to adversarial comment the factual basis for its rule).
94. See, e.g., id. at 253.
95. Ossification of rulemaking has had that effect on the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration. SeeJERRY L. MAsHAw & DAVID L. HARsr, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY 95-103, 149-65 (1990); see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, RISK AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
IMPROVING REGULATORY DECISION MAKING 107 (1993) ("many agencies today tend to skirt
the informal rulemaking process").
96. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 600, 1974 Md. Laws 2013 (codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV'T §§ 7-201 to -222 (1995)).
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a proposed regulation, 7 but that provision has not imposed a major
explanatory burden on agencies. 98 The contrast between the legisla-
tive model, applicable to rulemaking, and the trial model, applicable
to contested cases, thus remains quite sharp in Maryland.
B. Contested Case Procedures in Maryland
The more demanding contested case model requires the
agency99 to provide a trial-type process with a reasoned decision based
exclusively on the record.100 The trial judge is normally an ALJ em-
ployed by the OAH.' 01 The 1989 amendments to the APA eliminate
the authority of most agencies to employ their own hearing examin-
ers.102 Agency heads may, if they choose, conduct a contested case
hearing themselves, but only if the agency head10 3 presides; otherwise,
97. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 515, 1978 Md. Laws 1703, 1704 (codified at MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-112(a) (3)). Another provision, added in 1982, requires an agency
to evaluate the impact of a proposed regulation on different size businesses and to con-
sider adopting different regulations for different size businesses. MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T § 10-124.
98. Maryland Register notices addressing this requirement are normally quite brief.
99. The contested case subtitle of the APA (subtitle 2) broadly defines "agency" to
include "any officer or unit of the State government authorized by law to adjudicate con-
tested cases." MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(b) (1). It then exempts the following
executive branch agencies: the Governor; the Department of Assessments and Taxation;
the Insurance Division of the Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (except as
specifically provided); the Injured Workers' Insurance Fund; the Maryland Parole Commis-
sion; the Public Service Commission; the Maryland Tax Court; the State Workers' Compen-
sation Commission; the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund; and the Patuxent
Institution Board of Review (when acting on a parole request). Id. § 10-203(a) (3).
100. Id. §§ 10-207 to -219 (mandating procedural requirements); §§ 10-220 to -221 (re-
quiring reasoned decisions).
101. Id. § 9-1606(a) (requiring state agencies to "cooperate with the Chief Administra-
tive Law Judge"); § 9-1604(a) (4) (granting the Chief ALJ authority to assign ALJs to hear
contested cases).
102. Office of Administrative Hearings Act, ch. 788, 1989 Md. Laws 4284 (codified at
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 9-1601 to -1610). The OAH subtitle contains a second list
of exempt agencies that differs somewhat from that found in the contested case subtitle of
the APA. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 9-1601 (a). It is unclear why some, but not all, of
the agencies already exempted from the contested case subtitle appear on this second list
as well; the exemption from the contested case subtitle would seemingly extend to this
subtitle. What is significant about this second list is the appearance of three new agen-
cies-the Comptroller of the Treasury, the Health Services Cost Review Commission, and
the Health Resources Planning Commission. Id. The legislature evidently intends those
agencies to follow the procedural model for contested cases but without any need to in-
volve the OAH.
103. "Agency head" means the "individual or group of individuals in whom the ultimate
legal authority of an agency is vested by any provision of law." Id. § 10-202(c). A board or
commission may conduct contested case hearings, as well as an agency head. Id. § 10-
205(a) (1) (i).
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the agency must delegate hearing authority to the OAH.10 4 The
agency may delegate its hearing authority case by case or, as almost
always occurs, generically for all cases decided under a grant of statu-
tory authority." 5 The agency's delegation may also authorize the ALJ
to issue either a proposed or final decision.10 6 If the agency delegates
authority to issue a final decision,107 the ALJ's decision is directly re-
viewable in the circuit court;1 08 proposed decisions, however, are sub-
ject to agency review.'09 In either case, the APA requires the OAH to
complete the procedure within ninety days of the hearing."0
The trial-type process afforded the parties at a contested case
hearing resembles a bench trial in a civil case. Subpoenas are avail-
able for the production, but not the discovery, of witnesses and docu-
ments, and witnesses testify under oath."' A party may present oral
and documentary evidence and cross-examine witnesses called by an-
other party or the agency.11 2 Hearsay evidence is admissible, but rules
of privilege apply, and evidence supporting a finding must be proba-
104. Id. § 10-205(a)(1)(ii). Alternatively, with the prior written approval of the Chief
ALJ, the agency may delegate to a person not employed by the OAH the authority to
conduct the contested case hearing. Id.
105. Id. § 10-205(a)(1)(ii)(1).
106. Id. § 10-205(b).
107. Among the more important categories of cases in which the OAH has been dele-
gated final decisional authority are involuntary commitment and forced medication pro-
ceedings (Department of Health and Mental Hygiene) and drivers' license suspensions
and revocations (Department of Transportation). See Letter from Nelson J. Sabatini, Sec-
retary, Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, to John W. Hardwicke, Chief
Administrative LawJudge 2 (Feb. 23, 1994) (on file with author) (delegating authority for
involuntary commitment and forced medication hearings); Letter from James Ughthizer,
Secretary, Maryland Department of Transportation, toJohn W. Hardwicke, Chief Adminis-
trative Law Judge 4 (May 26, 1993) (delegating authority for drivers' license suspension
and revocation cases).
108. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222.
109. Id. § 10-220. In its delegation of authority, an agency may require the OAH to
allow it to review, and even to modify, a proposed decision before it is distributed to the
parties. Id. § 10-220(b) (2), (d)(4). The delegation letters on file at the OAH suggest that
few agencies have availed themselves of this possibility.
110. Id. § 10-205(e)(I)(ii). The Chief ALJ may extend the time limit. Id. § 10-
205(e) (2).
111. Id. § 9-1605(c). Although nonparty discovery is unavailable, the OAH's Rules of
Procedure require a party, upon request of another party, to provide discovery of docu-
ments and tangible things. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 28, § 02.01.10A (1994). The unavailability
of nonparty discovery does not violate due process. See Maryland Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 565 A.2d 1015, 1025-29 (Md. 1989) (holding no due pro-
cess violation where hearing officer denied motion for a psychological interview of an
abuse victim).
112. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-213(f).
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tive." 3 In addition, both proposed and final decisions must contain
findings of fact and conclusions of law;" 4 the findings of fact must be
based exclusively on evidence introduced into the record or officially
noticed during the proceeding. 15 To ensure a decision based on the
record, ex parte communications between the parties and the presid-
ing officer are prohibited."' Finally, the OAH's procedural rules for
contested cases apply, unless federal or state law requires that the del-
egating agency's regulations take precedence in the event of a
conflict."
17
The two-tiered decisional process, commonly employed in con-
tested cases, complicates the analogy to the judicial, or trial, model.
Unless the agency delegates final decisional authority to the OAH, the
agency head or her designee is responsible for the final agency deci-
sion."1 If the agency head makes the final decision, the parties have a
right to file exceptions to the proposed decision and to "present argu-
ment" to the final decisionmaker.' 19 In reviewing a proposed deci-
sion, an agency head does not function like an appellate judge, but
may freely substitute her findings of fact and conclusions of law for
those of the ALJ, except where credibility is at issue.'2 This arrange-
ment allows agency heads, usually political appointees, to apply their
expertise and policyjudgments to a record compiled by an independ-
entjudge.' 21 Agency heads, unlike ALJs, often exercise enforcement
113. Id. § 10-213(c), (e). The presiding officer may admit, and give effect to, "probative
evidence that reasonable and prudent individuals commonly accept in the conduct of their
affairs." Id. § 10-213(b). Hearsay evidence, if sufficiently probative, may provide the sub-
stantial evidence needed to support a finding. See Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Karwacki, 666
A.2d 511, 518 (Md. 1995) (holding sworn police report sufficient to support ALJ's decision
to suspend driver's license). The Karwacki court emphasized that the ALJ did not believe
the motorist's contrary testimony and that the motorist could have subpoenaed the police
officer. Id.
114. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 10-220(d) (2) (proposed decisions); § 10-221 (b) (1)
(final decisions).
115. Id. § 10-214(a).
116. Id. § 10-219.
117. Id. § 10-206(a)(2).
118. Id. § 10-205(a).
119. Id. § 10-216(a). Agencies generally permit written exceptions and oral argument.
120. See Anderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 623 A.2d 198,
209-13 (Md. 1993). The agency head must have "strong reasons" for rejecting an ALJ's
credibility determination. Id. at 213 (following Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1951)).
121. Federal law adopts a similar, uneasy compromise between the judicial model em-
bodied in the ALJ and the policymaking role of "expert" agency heads. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 557(b) (1994) (providing that when considering an appeal from an ALJ decision the
agency "has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision").
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and rulemaking, as well as adjudicatory responsibilities."' 2 Thus, the
separation of functions does not apply to the final agency decision.
Although ex parte communications are banned,12 3 an agency head,
board, or commission may communicate with advisory staff and coun-
sel who did not otherwise participate in the contested case.12 4
Final decisions in contested cases are reviewable in the circuit
courts. 12 5 Only parties aggrieved by the final decision are entitled to
judicial review.1 26 The APA's judicial review section specifies six
grounds for relief: unconstitutionality, excess of statutory authority,
unlawful procedure, other error of law, lack of substantial evidence,
and arbitrariness or capriciousness.12 7 The scope of review for final
decisions in contested cases is thus much broader than for preapplica-
tion review of regulations under the APA's declaratory judgment pro-
vision. 12 8 Regulations are subject to review for legality but not
rationality; the reviewing court does not determine whether substan-
tial evidence supports the regulation or whether the regulation is arbi-
trary or capricious. 129 The Federal APA and the 1981 Model State
APA reject this dichotomy between review of regulations and adjudica-
tory decisions. Both provide a unitary system of review applicable to
all final agency action; the scope of review depends on whether the
issue before the court is one of fact, law, or discretion, and not on
whether the agency resolves the issue in rulemaking or
adjudication.'
122. The Secretary of the Environment, for example, has statutory authority to adopt
regulations and to enforce environmental statutes and regulations. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR.
§ 1404(b), (i) (1996).
123. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-219(a)(1). An agency head is a "presiding of-
ficer" subject to the APA's restrictions on ex parte communications. Id. § 10-202(g) (when
making the agency's final decision in a contested case).
124. Id. § 10-219(a)(2).
125. Id. § 10-222. That section authorizes the reviewing court to:
reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have
been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision:
(i) is unconstitutional;
(ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker;
(iii) results from an unlawful procedure;
(iv) is affected by other error of law;
(v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of
the entire record as submitted; or
(vi) is arbitrary or capricious.
Id. § 10-222(h) (3).
126. Id. § 10-222(a).
127. Id. § 10-222(h)(3); see infra note 131.
128. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-125.
129. Id. § 10-125(d).
130. See5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994); 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33, § 5-116.
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For contested case proceedings, the reviewing court decides all
questions of law13 ' and subjects all findings of fact to substantial evi-
dence review.' 3 2 The approach by the Court of Appeals to substantial
evidence review reflectsJudge Hammond's classic formulation in State
Insurance Commissioner v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwritems3
whether "a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual
conclusion the agency reached." 134 Thus, agency findings of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence, bind the reviewing court, and the
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency.' 3 5 The
situation is less clear with respect to mixed questions-the agency's
application of the law to the facts-and to exercises of discretion. The
APA'sjudicial review section is silent on what is a "finding, conclusion,
or decision" subject to substantial evidence review.'3 6 In reviewing
131. Questions of law encompass the first four grounds listed in the judicial review pro-
vision of the APA. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(h) (3) (i)-(iv) (listing uncon-
stitutionality, excess of statutory authority, unlawful procedure, and other error of law as
grounds for reversal or modification). In reviewing issues of statutory authority, the Court
of Appeals has not adopted the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine, which requires a review-
ing court to accept the agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute if it is a reasonable
one. See Chevron U.SA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984). The Court of Appeals insists that an agency interpretation is never "binding" on a
court, although it may be entitled to deference if the agency has applied it consistently for
a long period of time. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 501 A.2d
1307, 1315 (Md. 1986). Similarly, an agency interpretation of a regulation receives great
deference, but does not bind the courts. See Ideal Fed. Say. Bank v. Murphy, 663 A.2d
1272, 1279 (Md. 1995) ("[A]n agency's interpretation of an administrative regulation is 'of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'"
(quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))).
132. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(h) (3) (v); see Liberty Nursing Ctr., Inc. v.
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 624 A.2d 941, 946 (1993).
133. 236 A.2d 282 (Md. 1967).
134. Id. at 292. Other frequently cited decisions describe substantial evidence review in
similar terms. See, e.g., Liberty Nursing Center, 624 A.2d at 945-46 ("If reasoning minds could
reasonably reach the conclusion reached by the agency from the facts in the record, then it
is based upon substantial evidence."); Caucus Distribs., Inc. v. Maryland Sec. Comm'r, 577
A.2d 783, 788 (Md. 1990) ("[Slubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reason-
able mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."); Bulluck v. Pelham Woods
Apts., 390 A.2d 1119, 1123-24 (Md. 1978) (determining "'whether a reasoning mind rea-
sonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached'" (quoting Dickin-
son-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 329 A.2d 18, 25 (Md. 1974))). Prior to
1978, the APA's judicial review section also required the reviewing court to determine if
the agency's findings of fact were "against the weight of competent, material, and substan-
tial evidence." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255(g) (6) (1957), repea/ed by Act of May 29, 1978,
ch. 884, 1978 Md. Laws 2586, 2594. Weight of the evidence review seems more intense
than substantial evidence review, but the National Bureau court found them to be basically
the same. National Bureau, 236 A.2d at 291-92 ("There are differences but they are slight
and under any of the standards the judicial review should be limited to whether a reason-
ing mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached.").
135. See Liberty Nursing Ctr., 624 A.2d at 945.
136. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(h) (3).
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Tax Court decisions, the Court of Appeals has treated mixed ques-
tions as it would findings of fact." 7 Thus, deferential substantial evi-
dence review applies to "findings of fact, drawing of inferences, and
application of law to the facts." l"' Applying that substantial evidence
review to contested cases is consistent with the Court of Appeals's en-
dorsement of rationality review, and the Court of Special Appeals has
done so.'
3 9
On the second issue, the APA's judicial review provision seem-
ingly authorizes review of discretionary agency action, providing that
the reviewing court may reverse an agency decision that is "arbitrary
or capricious." 40 The Court of Appeals, however, has given little at-
tention to that provision. In the federal system, review of discretion-
ary action under the arbitrary and capricious standard has often
proved intense."' Concern over the judicial role in reviewing such
action prompted the drafters of the 1981 Model State APA to offer a
unitaryjudicial review provision with two options. One option author-
ized review of agency action for unreasonableness, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness; the second option eliminated such review.' 4 2 As stated
by the drafters, the legislature might eliminate review for arbitrariness
or capriciousness "to discourage reviewing courts from substituting
their judgment for that of the agency as to the wisdom or desirability
137. See, e.g., Friends Sch. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 550 A.2d 657, 660 (Md. 1988)
(reviewing the application of law to the facts under a substantial evidence standard); Ram-
say, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 490 A.2d 1296, 1303 (Md. 1985) (af-
firming a Tax Court application of law to the facts under a substantial evidence standard).
138. Friends Sch., 550 A.2d at 660 n.2 (whether superintendent's house on school
grounds dedicated to "educational use"); see also Ramsay, Scarlett & Co., 490 A.2d at 1301
(whether separate accounting was authorized under MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 316(c)
(1980)).
139. See Strother v. Board of Educ., 623 A.2d 717, 721 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (restat-
ing the standard).
140. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(h)(3)(vi).
141. Perhaps the most well-known example is the Supreme Court's decision in Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). The case
involved a challenge to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's rescission of a
regulation requiring passive restraints on new motor vehicles. Id. at 34. There the Court
held that:
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Id. at 43.
142. See 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33, § 5-116(c) (8) (iv). Although review under the arbi-
trary and capricious standard is optional, the Model Act authorizes substantial evidence
review of all agency determinations of fact. Id. § 5-116(b) (7).
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of the agency action under review."14 Although Maryland's APA af-
fords that type of review for contested case decisions,"' it is not sur-
prising, given the Court of Appeals's aversion to anything resembling
judicial substitution of an agency's judgment, that it has remained a
dead letter.
The Maryland APA gives the circuit courts jurisdiction to review
final decisions in contested cases.' 45 The legislature cannot make
agency action directly reviewable in the Court of Special Appeals or
the Court of Appeals because the jurisdiction of those courts under
Maryland's Constitution is exclusively appellate.'46 Although judicial
review of agency action is often referred to as an appeal, the Court of
Appeals has held that "review of the decision of an administrative
agency is an exercise of original jurisdiction and not of appellate juris-
diction."147 This restriction on the legislature is unfortunate. Judicial
review under the APA is exclusively on the administrative record, 148
and the legislature might well find it advisable, in certain categories of
143. Id. § 5-116 cmt. Judge (now Justice) Breyer also noted the upside-down quality of
federal courts intensively reviewing agency exercises of discretion while accepting, under
the Chevron doctrine, agency interpretations of statutes, so long as the interpretation is
reasonable. See StephenJ. Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REv. 363, 397-98 (1986). That dichotomy encourages courts to meddle in policy matters
(the agency's business), while limiting their role in interpreting statutes (the court's busi-
ness). See id.
144. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(a).
145. Id. § 10-222(c). The petition for review must generally be filed within 30 days of
the final decision. MD. R. 7-203(a) (1996).
146. See Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 343 A.2d 521, 524 (Md. 1975).
147. Id. at 525 (citing Nevada Tax Comm'n v. Machie, 329 P.2d 448, 449 (Nev. 1958);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 10 S.E.2d 769, 772 (S.C. 1940)). Until July 1,
1993, the Court of Appeals mistakenly captioned its rules governing review of agency ac-
tion (the former Subtitle B Rules) as "Administrative Agencies-Appeals From." When the
Court of Appeals replaced those rules with the Title 7, Chapter 200 Rules, it changed the
caption to read, "Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decisions." See Department of
Gen. Servs. v. Harmans Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 633 A.2d 939, 943 n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec.App.
1993) (Wilner, C.J.).
148. The 1957 Maryland APA allowed the circuit court to take "de novo evidence." MD.
ANN. CODE art. 41, § 255(g)(6)-(7) (1957). In 1978, the legislature repealed these provi-
sions and required review to be based on the administrative record unless some other
statute provided for "de novo review." Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 884, 1978 Md. Laws 2586,
2594 (latter provision codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 252A (1982)). In 1993, the
legislature, following a recommendation of the Tiburzi Commission, eliminated from the
APA the reference to statutes requiring de novo review and adopted a rule of interpreta-
tion that "de novo" means "judicial review based upon an administrative record." MD.
ANN. CODE art. 1, § 32(a) (1995). This rule of interpretation is subject to several excep-
tions. Id. § 32(b). One of those exceptions appears in the APA itself, which allows the
taking of new evidence by the circuit court under very limited circumstances. MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(g) (2) (testimony on procedural irregularities). The reviewing
court has broader authority to expand the record by ordering the agency to take additional
evidence. Id. § 10-222(f) (newly discovered evidence).
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contested cases, to allow direct review in the Court of Special Appeals.
Such an approach might be appropriate if the cases involved were
modest in number and likely to involve significant legal issues. 149 For
those cases, eliminating circuit court review might well produce
efficiencies.'
50
The courts' performance of their review function further demon-
strates the tenuousness of the distinction between original and appel-
late jurisdiction. Under the APA, a party aggrieved by a final
judgment of a circuit court may normally appeal to the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals;15 ' certiorari is also available to the Court of Appeals.' 52
The appellate courts do not, as one might expect, review the circuit
court's judgment; rather, they "essentially repeat the task of the circuit
court." 55 Thus, the appellate court determines whether the agency
erred and not whether the lower court did so.M As the Court of Ap-
peals explained: "[A] reviewing court, be it a circuit court or an ap-
pellate court, shall apply the substantial evidence test to the final
decisions of an administrative agency."' 55 It is, therefore, hard to un-
derstand why the Court of Appeals may review an administrative rec-
ord for substantial evidence on appeal from a lower court, but not if a
lower court has not intervened. In both cases the Court of Appeals
reviews the agency's decision; but in neither case does the Court of
Appeals revise or correct the judgment of a lower court in any mean-
ingful sense.
15 6
149. Review of Tax Court decisions is an example. Under the statutes declared uncon-
stitutional in Shell O// 343 A.2d at 528, the legislature had authorized direct review by the
Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals. Id. at 523. Tax Court decisions are now
initially reviewable in the circuit court. MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 13-532 (1995).
150. Congress enjoys greater flexibility and may assign judicial review of agency action
to either a trial or an appellate court. On the policy questions raised by this choice, see
David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest
for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5-23 (1975).
151. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-223(b).
152. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 12-201 (1995) (permitting parties to peti-
tion the Court of Appeals for certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals).
153. Kohli v. LOOC, Inc., 654 A.2d 922, 935 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), cert. granted, 678
A.2d 1047 (Md. 1996).
154. See id.
155. Baltimore Lutheran High Sch. Ass'n, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Admin., 490 A.2d
701, 708 (Md. 1985). In Anderson v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 623
A.2d 198, 220 (Md. 1993), the Court of Appeals quoted that language to justify its determi-
nation that substantial evidence did not support the agency's findings. Id.
156. In Shell Oi the Court of Appeals, quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTrrTUON OF THE UNITED STATES § 1755 (1833), treated the revising and corrective
power as "the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction." Shell Oil Co. v. Supervisor of
Assessments, 343 A.2d 521, 525 (Md. 1975). Of course, under the present system, the
Court of Special Appeals or Court of Appeals will affirm or reverse the circuit court's judg-
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C. Application of Rulemaking vs. Adjudication Dichotomy
The procedural models applicable to rulemaking and adjudica-
tion under Maryland's APA afford affected persons strikingly different
opportunities to participate in agency decisionmaking and to obtain
judicial review. Under the adjudicatory model, the parties have the
right to a decision based on a record compiled through trial-type pro-
cedures before an independent judicial officer;15 7 courts may review
that decision for both legality and rationality.'58 Under the rulemak-
ing model, any person may submit written or oral comments to in-
form or persuade the agency decisionmaker, 5 9 but there is no
opportunity to challenge effectively, before the agency or in court, the
factual basis for the regulation.16 ° Rulemaking is thus a legislative-
type process and adjudication a trial-type process. In the former, in-
terested persons may present their views; in the latter, parties present
proof subject to cross-examination.
This dichotomy between rulemaking and adjudicatory proceed-
ings makes sense if it reflects a difference in the factual disputes the
agency needs to resolve. Disputed facts, according to Professor Davis,
are either adjudicative or legislative.' 6 ' Trial-type procedures are ap-
propriate for determining adjudicative facts. Adjudicative facts "usu-
ally answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how, why,
with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of
facts that go to ajury in ajury case."' 62 Adjudicative facts thus pertain
to particular persons and their activities. For example, did a land-
owner dredge and fill wetlands without a permit, or did a licensee
misappropriate her client's funds? Ordinarily, those types of facts
ought not to be determined without providing affected persons an
opportunity to know and meet unfavorable evidence in a trial-type
proceeding. 63 On the other hand, notice and comment procedures
are appropriate to ascertain legislative facts. Legislative facts do not
ment depending on whether the circuit court reached the same result in reviewing the
agency decision as did the appellate court. Nevertheless, the appellate court reviews the
agency decision, and any error committed by the circuit court cannot be grounds for rever-
sal. See Genie & Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 668 A.2d 1013, 1023 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1995) ("U]udicial review under the APA is essentially identical on appeal to this court
as it was before the circuit court.").
157. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-207 to -221 (1995).
158. Id. § 10-222.
159. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 79-130 and accompanying text.






concern particular persons, "but are the general facts which help the
tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion." 164 Exam-
ples of legislative facts include the health hazards posed by cigarette
smoke in workplaces and the capacity of persons under fourteen years
of age safely to operate power boats.165 Generally, trials are neither
necessary nor appropriate when agencies determine disputed legisla-
tive facts. 1 66
Some of the more ardent proponents of the adjudicative-legisla-
tive fact distinction favor abandoning the rulemaking-adjudication di-
chotomy and substituting a unitary proceeding. 161 Under this
approach, an agency would structure the proceeding to accommodate
the factual disputes to be resolved.1 6 ' The agency would use notice
and comment procedures to determine legislative facts and trial-type
procedures to determine adjudicative facts, regardless of whether the
agency was rulemaking or adjudicating. 69 The proponents appear to
be mainly concerned about the wasteful use of trial-type process to
determine legislative facts in adjudication. 170 The proponents also
recognize, however, that more than notice and comment procedures
might sometimes be needed in rulemaking to resolve specific issues of
material fact.1 7 1 Their goal is to achieve a closer fit between the facts
in dispute and the procedures used to resolve those disputes. 72
Agency fact-finding procedures should conform to the nature of the
facts in dispute and not to the classification of the proceeding as
rulemaking or adjudication.
This functional approach is appealing. Two leading zoning cases
demonstrate the Court of Appeals's commitment to the unitary ap-
164. See id.
165. Maryland agencies recently determined these legislative facts in rulemaking pro-
ceedings. See Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 654 A.2d 449 (Md. 1995) (reviewing a regu-
lation banning smoking in most workplaces); Christ v. Maryland Dep't of Natural
Resources, 644 A.2d 34 (Md. 1994) (upholding a regulation banning persons under 14
years of age from operating power boats).
166. See Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 376 A.2d 483, 497 (1977).
167. See 3 KENNETH Culu DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 14:4, at 18 (2d ed.
1980); 2 DAVIS, supra note 161, §§ 12:5-12:6, at 420-30; Glenn 0. Robinson, The Making of
Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure
Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 536-38 (1970); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of
Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258, 322 (1978). Professor Davis believes that
the Federal APA gives federal agencies sufficient flexibility to conform their procedures to
the nature of the facts in dispute. See 3 DAVIS, supra; § 14:4, at 23-24.
168. See Robinson, supra note 167, at 537.
169. See 2 DAVIs, supra note 161, § 12:5, at 422.
170. See id.; Verkuil, supra note 167, at 320-21.
171. See 2 DAvis, supra note 161, § 12:8, at 438-39.
172. See id.
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proach if the APA does not apply. Both cases involved the same statu-
tory provision giving interested persons a right to a "public heating"
in connection with an application to amend the Montgomery County
zoning map.173 In Hyson v. Montgomery County Coun,/ 1 74 the court
held that affected property owners had the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses at a sectional map amendment hearing before the county coun-
cil.' 75  Although the Hyson court conceded that zoning
reclassifications were "legislative or quasi-legislative," 176 it reasoned
that the adjudicative facts in dispute determined "the type of public
hearing which the Council was required to afford. " 177 Eleven years
later, in Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc.,' 78 the Court of
Appeals distinguished Hyson as involving piecemeal rezoning and held
that property owners challenging a comprehensive rezoning did not
have a right to a trial-type hearing. 79 According to the Woodward &
Lothrop court, whether the comprehensive rezoning bore "the requi-
site relationship to the public health, safety and general welfare" was
not an adjudicative determination "affecting one property owned by
one person." 8a Rather, the council's determinations were "classically
legislative. . . designed to affect local and regional needs and all prop-
erty owners within the planning area."' 8 ' The court found it irrele-
vant that downzoning the challengers' property from business to
residential might affect protected property interests. 182 What deter-
mined a party's right to an adjudicatory hearing was, according to the
court, "the nature of the decision's fact-finding process, not the ulti-
mate effect of the decision. "183 Thus, the legislative-type hearing af-
forded the aggrieved property owners all the process they were due. 1 84
The Court of Appeals has adopted a different approach in distin-
guishing between rulemaking and adjudication under Maryland's
APA. Rather than focusing on the nature of the facts in dispute, as it
173. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE § 59-204 (Supp. 11 1974).
174. 217 A.2d 578 (Md. 1966).
175. Id. at 585-86.
176. Id. at 583.
177. Id. at 584.
178. 376 A.2d 483 (Md. 1977). For a recent application of the Hyson and Woodward &
Lothrop cases, see Woodmont Country Club v. Mayor of Rockvile, 670 A.2d 968, 986 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App.), cert. granted, 677 A.2d 583 (Md. 1996), holding that the city council's denial of
the right to cross-examination at the special assessment hearing violated due process.
179. Woodward & Lothrop, 376 A.2d at 497.
180. Id. at 498.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 495.
183. Id. at 497.
184. Id. at 495.
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did in the zoning cases, the court inquires whether the agency action
is of "general" or "particular" applicability."l 5 Rulemaking generates
"prescriptive statements" of general applicability and future effect, 186
whereas adjudication applies the law to "a specific person or entity."18 7
Thus, the adoption of general standards is rulemaking, and the appli-
cation of those standards to a particular person is adjudication. An
agency adjudicates when it grants a license or approves a particular
rate filing; the decision's policymaking component and prospective
effect do not transform it into a rulemaking.188 All licensing and most
ratemaking are thus adjudicatory under the Maryland APA. For ex-
ample, the Health Services Cost Review Commission proceeds hospital
by hospital in approving rates; those proceedings are, therefore, con-
tested cases reviewable under the APA.' 89 Likewise, the Public Service
Commission determines company by company what are just and rea-
sonable rates;190 those proceedings are not subject to the APA because
they are neither rulemaking (the rate order is of particular applicabil-
ity) nor contested cases (the Commission is exempt from the con-
tested case subtitle of the APA). "
The Court of Appeals's distinction between matters of general
and particular applicability is consistent with the Maryland APA. The
Act defines "regulation" to include "a statement or amendment or re-
peal of a statement" that has "general application" and "future effect"
185. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 575 A.2d 324, 328 (Md. 1990)
(holding that an agency must utilize rulemaking to change an existing rule).
186. Id. at 326. Under the Federal APA, a rule may be either of general or particular
applicability; the hallmark of a rule is its prospective effect. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1994).
Federal law treats a rule as general and not particular, even though only one person is
subject to the rule, provided the rule does not name that specific person. See, e.g., Ana-
conda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1304 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that a challenge
to a proposed EPA rule was not ripe because it had yet to be applied to any individual).
187. Medical Waste Assocs., Inc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc., 612 A.2d 241, 248
(Md. 1992). In Medical Waste Assocs., Judge Eldridge suggested that this definition of adju-
dication applies in non-APA cases as well. Id. That dictum reflects a change in the court's
position. Cf Chevy Chase Village v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 239 A.2d 740, 745
(Md. 1968) (grant of building permit is "quasi-legislative"); Woodward & Lothrop, 376 A.2d
at 497 (grant of building permit in Chevy Chase is not "quasijudicial").
188. The Federal APA defines adjudication to include licensing. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(7).
However, ratemaking of particular applicability-applicable to a named entity-is
rulemaking. See supra note 186.
189. See Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n v. Franklin Square Hosp., 372 A.2d 1051,
1055 (Md. 1977) (noting that agency determination of certain facts is reviewable under the
APA).
190. See Building Owners & Managers Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 A.2d 1006,
1012 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1992). Most ratemaking in Maryland appears to be of particular
applicability. For an example of ratemaking of general applicability, see the regulation of
the Maryland Port Authority, discussed infra note 247.
191. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-203(a) (3) (vi) (1995).
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and is adopted by an agency to "detail or carry out" a law that the
agency administers.1 9 2 In a contested case, on the other hand, the
agency "determines" either a "right, duty, statutory entitlement, or
privilege of a person" or "the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, sus-
pension, or amendment of a license."193 Regulations, therefore, im-
plement statutes generally; in doing so, they "detail" or "carry out" the
law. Regulations do not, however, determine rights of specific per-
sons; that determination occurs when the agency applies a regulation
or statute to specific parties.1
9 4
Despite the advantages of tailoring procedures to the nature of
the facts in dispute, the federal and most state APAs have, like Mary-
land, maintained the traditional rulemaking-adjudication dichot-
192. Id. § 10-101(g). The definition reads in full:
(g) Regulation - (1) "Regulation" means a statement or an amendment or repeal
of a statement that
(i) has general application;
(ii) has future effect;
(iii) is adopted by a unit to:
1. detail or carry out a law that the unit administers;
2. govern organization of the unit;
3. govern the procedure of the unit; or
4. govern practice before the unit; and




4. a statement of interpretation; or
5. a statement of policy.
(2) "Regulation" does not include:
(i) a statement that:
1. concerns only internal management of the unit; and
2. does not affect directly the rights of the public or the procedures
available to the public;
(ii) a response of the unit to a petition for adoption of a regulation, under
§ 10-123 of this subtitle; or
(iii) a declaratory ruling of the unit as to a regulation, order, or statute,
under Subtitle 3 of this tile.
(3) "Regulation," as used in §§ 10-110 and 10-111.1, means all or any portion of a
regulation.
Id.
193. Id. § 10-202(d). For the complete text of the definition of contested case, see infra
note 323.
194. The 1957 Maryland APA made this distinction clearer by defining a contested case
to mean a proceeding for determining the rights of "specific parties." MD. ANN. CODE art.
41, § 244(c) (1957). The term "person" was substituted for "specific parties" in this defini-
tion when the APA was incorporated into the State Government Article in 1984. MD. CODE
ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-201(c) (1984). The Revisor provided no explanation for this
change.
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omy.195 Such an approach seems appropriate for three reasons. First,
the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts is often more
difficult to draw than the distinction between rulemaking and adjudi-
cation. Second, it is possible to develop considerable procedural flexi-
bility within the distinct categories of rulemaking and adjudication.
Third, and most important, there is already a rough fit between adju-
dication and adjudicative facts and rulemaking and legislative facts. 19 6
This fit is particularly tight for general rulemaking proceedings
and accusatory adjudicatory proceedings. An example of the former
is the Division of Labor and Industry's recent proceeding to promul-
gate a regulation prohibiting smoking in enclosed workplaces.' 9 7 The
regulation, like a statute, was prospective in effect and applied gener-
ally, rather than to specifically named workplaces.' 98 The regulation's
opponents challenged the scientific evidence on which the Division
relied to establish the health hazards of environmental tobacco
smoke, but the court found that the Division's notice and comment
procedures were adequate to resolve the issues of disputed legislative
fact.'9 9 Examples of accusatory adjudicatory proceedings would in-
clude a disciplinary action against a state employee or a license revoca-
tion for violating a regulatory standard. 0 In those cases the agency
must determine what the employee or licensee did in order to apply
the law to those facts. Once again, the fit is reasonably close between
the facts likely to be in dispute and the APA's procedures. The dis-
puted facts will be adjudicative, and trial-type procedures will be suita-
ble for resolving them. The same is likely to be so for cases involving
the termination of welfare or other benefits. 20 1
Initial licensing and ratemaking cases are more problematic. Li-
censing is "a distinctive genre, partaking of the characteristics both of
195. The Florida APA, as amended in 1974, is the one significant exception. That Act
abolishes the traditional distinction and substitutes in its place formal (trial-type) proceed-
ings for resolving disputed issues of material fact and informal (notice and comment) pro-
ceedings for all other matters. FLk. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West 1996). As in the Court of
Appeals's zoning decisions, the nature of the facts in dispute determines the type of pro-
cess required.
196. See Bonfield, supra note 4, at 308-16.
197. See Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 654 A.2d 449 (Md. 1995).
198. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 9, § 12.23 (1994).
199. See H & G Restaurant, 654 A.2d at 458.
200. See, e.g., Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 625 A.2d 914, 923-24 (Md. 1993) (holding
that disciplinary action against employee is a contested case); Prince George's County v.
Blumberg, 418 A.2d 1155, 1167 (Md. 1980) (holding that license revocation or suspension
is a contested case).
201. See, e.g., Murray v. State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 272 A.2d 16, 17 (Md. 1971) (holding
that termination of welfare benefits is a contested case).
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rule making and of adjudication." °2 2 When granting or denying a li-
cense, an agency determines the present right of a specific person, but
it does not do so by applying a legal standard to past adjudicative facts.
Rather, the agency must predict whether the future effect of granting
the license is likely to be consistent with its statutory mandate-will
the licensee behave properly, and what effect will the licensed activity
have on other persons?20 Those predictive determinations are often
formulated as issues of adjudicative fact (does this applicant satisfy all
relevant criteria?), but the policymaking or legislative component of
initial licensing often remains quite pronounced.0 4 The agency must
make a judgment with respect to the future and not, as in license sus-
pensions and revocations, resolve an accusation of past misconduct.20
5
In this context, the distinction between legislative and adjudicative
facts becomes exceedingly difficult to apply.206
Responding to this concern, the Federal APA exempts initial li-
censing from some of the trial-type procedures required for formal
adjudication under sections 554, 556, and 557.207 The APA's drafters
believed that initial licensing determinations were "much like
rulemaking."2 " Thus, in initial licensing, federal agencies have more
flexibility than in other formal adjudications. Section 556(d) allows
agencies to adopt procedures for the presentation of all or part of the
evidence in written form; section 554(d) permits the use of staff ex-
perts, including those who have taken adversarial positions, to formu-
late the agency's decision; and section 557(b) authorizes an agency to
eliminate an initial or recommended decision by the ALJ.2°9 These
adjustments in the trial-type procedures for formal adjudication assist
agencies in using their expertise to determine legislative facts and to
202. 2 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 483 (1965).
203. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL's MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACr 51 n.5 (1947) [hereinafter ATroRNEY GENERAL's MANUAL] (discussing air-
line route certificates).
204. See id. at 50-53.
205. See supra note 200.
206. For example, a leading environmental permitting case treats as an adjudicative fact
the predicted effect of thermal pollution-heated water discharged by a nuclear plant-on
marine life. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 881-82 (1st Cir.
1978). For Professors Davis and Pierce, the fact is clearly legislative. See I DAviS & PIERCE,
supra note 50, § 8.2, at 383.
207. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (1994).
208. See ATrORNEY GENERAL's MANUAL, supra note 203, at 50-53 (discussing the Federal
APA's legislative history).
209. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 556(d), 557(b). For a vigorous defense of these provisions,
especially the elimination of separation of function constraints, see William E. Pedersen,




make policy in initial licensing proceedings.21 ° Maryland's APA does
not contain any comparable provisions; not surprisingly, initial
licensings have sometimes posed special problems when adjudicated
as contested cases. 2
11
The Federal APA's treatment of ratemaking is a bit more com-
plex. The Act defines rulemaking as the "approval or prescription"
for the future "of rates" and other charges, regardless of whether the
agency proceeds generally (approving rates for a whole industry) or
particularly (approving rates for a named entity).2 1 2 The drafters evi-
dently assumed that most agency ratemaking would occur through
modified trial-type procedures. 21 3 That assumption soon proved un-
workable, at least for ratemaking of general applicability in which the
agency makes "a basically legislative-type judgment, for prospective ap-
plication only."21 Thus, in United States v. Florida East Coast Railway,21 5
the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) pro-
vided the hearing required by the Interstate Commerce Act 2 1 6 when
the ICC utilized notice and comment procedures to determine gener-
ally what per diem charges provided railroads an incentive to return
empty boxcars to their owners.2 1 7 In upholding the ICC's action, the
Court carefully distinguished, as involving a "quasi-judicial" proceed-
ing, an earlier case requiring the ICC to use a trial-type process in
determining whether a particular railroad's rates were unreasona-
210. The EPA has invoked the partial exemption of initial licensing from the require-
ments of formal adjudication to craft relatively informal procedures for environmental per-
mitting. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 191-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (upholding the EPA's nonadversarial panel procedures for the
issuance of discharge permits).
211. See infra text accompanying notes 497-520.
212. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
213. See ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 203, at 32-35. Ratemaking statutes
generally required a hearing;, it was, therefore, assumed that agencies would promulgate
rates under the trial-type procedures found in APA sections 556 and 557 (including special
provisions similar to those applicable to initial licensing), rather than under the notice and
comment procedures found in section 553. Sections 556 and 557 apply when rules are
"required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5
U.S.C. § 553(c).
214. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1973). On the unsuitability
of trial-type procedures for promulgating rules of general applicability, see Robert W.
Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural
Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276, 1278-1313 (1972).
215. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
216. 49 U.S.C. § 1(14)(a), recodified at49 U.S.C. § 11122 (1994).
217. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 238-46. The Court also held that the hearing re-
quired by the Interstate Commerce Act did not trigger the applicability of sections 556 and
557 of the APA. Id. at 234-38.
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ble.218 The Court thus emphasized the fit between adjudicative facts
and matters of particular applicability and between legislative facts
and matters of general applicability. Maryland is, therefore, correct in
treating only ratemaking of particular applicability as adjudicatory.21 9
Initial licensing and general ratemaking thus raise concerns
about using trial-type procedures to determine legislative facts.220 An-
other related concern is the use of formal, trial-type procedures where
the private interests at stake are modest, even if the facts in dispute are
likely to be adjudicative. 22' Developing fair, informal procedures for
such cases was considered-primarily in the mid- and late-1970s-an
important challenge confronting administrative law.222 Scholars vig-
orously debated which procedural components for informal adjudica-
tion were essential, and a consensus developed that fairness required,
at a minimum, notice to affected parties, an opportunity to make writ-
ten or oral submissions, and a statement of reasons from an impartial
decisionmaker. 22 ' This informal adjudicatory process closely resem-
bles informal notice and comment rulemaking; although there is an
impartial decisionmaker (not required in rulemaking),224 there is no
presentation of testimony subject to cross-examination to compile a
formal trial record.
The 1981 Model State APA responds to this interest in informal
procedures with two new adjudicatory models to supplement the con-
218. See ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 91-92 (1913), distinguished in
Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 244.
219. The 1961 Model State APA treated all ratemaking as adjudicatory. See 1961
MSAPA, supra note 6, § 1(2) (classifying all ratemaking as a contested case). The 1981
Model State APA, like the Maryland APA, treats ratemaking of general applicability as
rulemaking and ratemaking of particular applicability as adjudicatory. See 1981 MSAPA,
supra note 33, §§ 1-102(5), (10).
220. See supra notes 212-219 and accompanying text.
221. See 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33, § 4-503, which provides for informal procedures
when minor interests are at issue.
222. See 2 DAvis, supra note 161, § 13.7, at 473-74. No doubt the Supreme Court's varia-
ble due process cases stimulated this line of inquiry. In interpreting the Due Process
Clause, the Court often found some kind of hearing was due, but declined to require, as
too burdensome, trial-type procedures when the private interests at stake were modest. See,
e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (ten-day suspension of high school student);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566-70 (1974) (revocation of prisoner's good time
credits).
223. See HenryJ. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1267, 1279-92 (1975).
The consensus stated in the text derives from Judge Friendly's article. See also Warner M.
Gardner, The Procedures y Which Informal Action Is Taken, 24 ADMIN. L. REv. 155, 163-64
(1972); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739,
780-81 (1976).
224. See Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(concluding rulemaker not disqualified unless her mind is "unalterably closed").
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tested case model. 225 The conference hearing model provides a
stripped-down version of a formal hearing: notice, an opportunity to
testify and to submit written exhibits, an ALJ as the initial deci-
sionmaker, limits on ex parte contacts, findings and reasons, and
226 1agency review. Other elements of a formal hearing are not present:
prehearing conferences, subpoenas, discovery, cross-examination, and
testimony by nonparties.2 2 7 In contrast, the summary adjudicative
model affords a party the minimum process envisioned by the advo-
cates of informal procedures: notice, an opportunity to state her posi-
tion, a reasoned decision by a responsible agency official, and
administrative review.22 8 The provisions of the 1981 Model State APA
allow an agency to use these informal adjudicatory procedures, not
only if there are no material facts in dispute or if the parties consent,
but also if the interests involved are relatively minor.229
Despite much scholarly praise, the informal adjudicatory mod-
els have generated little response from state legislatures. Of the three
states that have adopted the 1981 Model State APA, only Washington
has included the APA provisions on informal adjudication. 3 a Infor-
mal adjudicatory procedures in other states are either optional2 2 or
225. See 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33, §§ 4-401, 4-502.
226. See id. § 4-402.
227. See id.
228. See id. § 4-503; supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text.
229. For example, conference hearings are permissible if the monetary amount in dis-
pute is not more than $1000 (or other amount designated by the legislature). See 1981
MSAPA, supra note 33, § 4-401(2). They are also permissible for disciplinary sanctions
against prisoners and, if no more than a ten-day suspension is at stake, against students and
public employees. See id. Summary adjudicative proceedings are permissible if the mone-
tary amount in dispute is not more than $100. See id. § 4-502(3). They are also permissible
for reprimands to public employees, denials of public employment, and rejections by pub-
lic educational institutions. See id. The legislature may add other subject matter areas if it
chooses.
230. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Toward a New Calfornia Administrative Procedure Act: Adju-
dication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. Rav. 1067, 1094-1105 (1992) (praising flexibility); Ar-
thur Earl Bonfield, Administrative Procedure Acts in an Age of Comparative Scarcity, 75 IowA L.
REv. 845, 849 (1990) (praising simplification of proceedings and their reduced cost).
231. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.482 (West 1996). That section allows an agency to
conduct a brief adjudicative proceeding-similar to the 1981 Model State APA's summary
adjudicative proceeding-if the agency determines by regulation that the issues and inter-
ests involved do not require more formal procedures. Id. § 34.05.482(d). The only agency
that appears to have adopted such a regulation is the University of Washington. WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 365-210-070 (West 1996) (failure on examination); § 1321-130-030 (tuition
and fee waivers).
232. See Karen E. Boxx, Comment, Experiments in Agency Justice: Informal Adjudicatoty Pro-
cedures in Administrative Procedure Acts, 58 WASH. L. REv. 39, 50-51 (1982) (discussing statutes
in Delaware, Montana, and Virginia).
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applicable only if no adjudicative facts are in dispute.23 3 This prefer-
ence for formal adjudication reflects a judgment that trial-type proce-
dures are usually necessary to determine disputed adjudicative facts.
It seems fairer, if informal procedures do not resolve a dispute, to give
the affected party an opportunity to appear with witnesses before an
impartial decisionmaker, rather than to devise procedures for depriv-
ing aggrieved parties of their proverbial day in court. At least most
state legislatures appear to believe S.4
II. RULEMAKING AND THE MARYLAND APA
Rulemaking proceedings, although limited to matters of general
applicability, occupy a far larger terrain in Maryland than does infor-
mal rulemaking in the federal system. There are two explanations for
this phenomenon. First, the Maryland APA does not replicate the nu-
merous exemptions from notice and comment rulemaking found in
section 553 of the Federal APA.235 The Act does contain an "internal
management" exception,"' but the Attorney General has given that
exception a narrow construction.3 7 Second, both the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Court of Appeals have sharply restricted the ability of
agencies to make general policy through adjudication. 38 As a result
of these initiatives, agencies normally must use rulemaking proce-
dures to make general policy.
The numerous rulemaking exemptions in the Federal APA have
produced an additional, less formal model often called "publication
233. See, e.g., FiA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57 (West 1996). Under Florida's APA, which merges
rulemaking and adjudication, formal procedures are available only if material facts are in
dispute. Id.
234. But see CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11445.10 to .60 (West 1996) (establishing informal
hearing procedures). The informal hearing article of the new California APA, modeled on
the 1981 Model State APA's conference hearing, grants the presiding officer broad discre-
tion in limiting testimony and cross-examination. Id.
235. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994) (listing numerous exemptions); cf MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOVT § 10-111 (1995).
236. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOVT § 10-101(g) (2) (i).
237. See 75 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 90-004, 15, 27 (Jan. 23, 1990) (stating that internal man-
agement exception applies only if the regulation actually concerns "internal management"
and the regulation does not directly affect public rights or procedures). Although the
Opinion and statute do not explicitly define "internal management," the Attorney General
further opined that "a statement does not 'concer[n] only internal management'" if ad-
dressed to individuals outside the agency. Id.
238. See 72 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 321-22 (1987) (requiring rulemaking for making
general policy); see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 501 A.2d 1307,
1319 (Md. 1986) (stating in dicta that formulating rules by adjudication could be an abuse
of discretion (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947))) .
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rulemaking. "239 Under this model, the agency either publishes the
adopted rule in the Federal Register-ultimately codifying it in the
Code of Federal Regulations-or makes the adopted rule available for
public inspection under the Freedom of Information Act."4 In
neither case does the agency provide any opportunity for public par-
ticipation prior to adopting the rule. This publication model is per-
missible for rules exempted from the notice and comment provisions
in section 553 of the Federal APA. The exemptions fall into three
categories: subject matter exemptions (rules relating to military or
foreign affairs, public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts);
exemptions for nonlegislative rules 4' (interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, and rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice); and a general good-cause exemption where notice and
comment procedures are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to
the public interest. 42
These exemptions have received their share of criticism, and the
Administrative Conference has adopted a number of recommenda-
tions urging agencies not to invoke them. 4 The publication model
nevertheless seems appropriate, at least for exempt rules in the sec-
ond and third categories. For those categories, the cost of public pro-
cedures-mainly extra effort and delay-may exceed the benefits.
Nonlegislative rules-interpretive rules and policy statements-do not
bind members of the public, but if published they do bind agency staff
and provide public guidance as to how the agency is likely to act.2"
Similarly, rules adopted under the good-cause exemption are usually
either noncontroversial or responsive to situations requiring the
agency promptly to provide public guidance.245 These exemptions
thus encourage desirable rulemaking that might otherwise not occur.
239. Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE LJ. 1463, 1467 (1992).
240. See id. at 1470. For exempt rules of general applicability, the agency must use the
Federal Register. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1).
241. A legislative or substantive rule has the force and effect of law; it is thus binding
both on the agency and on private parties. See ScHwARTz, supra note 46, § 4.8, at 180-81.
242. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (B).
243. See FEDERAL AGENCy RULEMAKING, supra note 60, at 48-87. The ossification of infor-
mal rulemaking may prompt a trend in the opposite direction. The Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development recently proposed repealing its prior waiver of several section
553 exemptions. See Rulemaking, Policies and Procedures-Expediting Rulemaking and
Policy Implementation, 57 Fed. Reg. 47, 166 (1992).
244. See Strauss, supra note 239, at 1468-69. Professor Strauss recognizes that higher
level agency decisionmakers normally can depart from a nonlegislative rule if they provide
an explanation. See id.
245. See Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Re-
quirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. LJ. 317, 321, 337-38 (1989). Dur-
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Maryland's APA, like its federal counterpart, defines "regulation"
broadly to cover interpretive rules, policy statements, and rules gov-
erning practice and procedure.24 Unlike the Federal Act, however,
the Maryland Act does not exempt nonlegislative regulations from
public rulemaking proceedings. 247 Thus, an agency must use notice
and comment procedures to adopt interpretive regulations and policy
statements. The only exception found in the Act is for matters of "in-
ternal management."24 According to the Attorney General, that ex-
ception applies to a staff directive or similar statement only if the
internal guidance it provides to staff "'does not significantly affect
either the procedural steps that interested persons must take in their
dealings with an agency or the allocation of substantive benefits or
burdens.' 24 9 Although the Attorney General applied that test to find
that the Governor's Policy on Smoking fell within the exception,250 it
would seem that most interpretive rules would not be exempt because
they do affect how agency staff treat members of the public.
Equating the procedures for promulgating binding and nonbind-
ing regulations seems questionable. The Attorney General has recom-
mended that the legislature consider amending the APA to exempt
interpretive regulations from notice and comment procedures. 251 Ac-
cording to the Attorney General, almost all of the states follow the
Federal APA and the 1961 and 1981 Model State APAs in restricting
public rulemaking procedures to statements of a "legislative na-
ture."252 Maryland's overuse of rulemaking procedures prompted the
Tiburzi Commission to recommend a comparable change.255 Rather
ing the six-month period studied by Professor Lavilla, over 30% of all final rules appearing
in the Federal Register were adopted pursuant to this exemption. See id. at 339-40.
246. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-101(g) (1995).
247. Id. It also does not exempt rulemaking relative to public property, loans, grants,
benefits, or contracts. Id. The Attorney General nevertheless found implicit in the Act a
narrow exemption for proprietary price-setting by the Maryland Port Authority. See 68 Md.
Op. Att'y Gen. 9, 9 (1983). The price-setting was of general applicability, the Attorney
General nevertheless found it was exempt, reasoning that it was unreasonable to require
rulemaking procedures every time an agency changed the price of carrots and peas in the
cafeteria line. See id. at 15.
248. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-101 (g) (2) (i); see supra notes 236-237 and accom-
panying text.
249. 75 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 90-004, 15, 29 (Jan. 23, 1990) (quoting 72 Md. Op. Att'y
Gen. 230, 235-36 (1987)); see also 79 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 94-029, 217, 222 (May 13, 1994)
(stating Public Defender's eligibility criteria not covered by internal management
exception).
250. 72 Md. Op. Att'y Gen., at 236 (stating that persons transacting public business "do
not have a right to smoke while doing so").
251. See id. at 27.
252. Id.
253. See TIBURZI COMMISSION SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 9-10.
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than distinguishing between legislative and nonlegislative statements,
the Commission sought to define a category of noncontroversial regu-
lations-those unlikely to attract public comment-that agencies
could adopt through short-track procedures.254 Those procedures
would apply primarily to curative, corrective, or technical changes that
conform regulations to superseding state and federal law.155 Both the
Attorney General's and the Commission's proposals deserve serious
consideration.
Maryland's distinctive approach to required rulemaking provides
the second explanation for rulemaking's comparative importance.256
A hallmark of federal administrative law is the broad discretion of
agencies to choose between rulemaking and adjudication when for-
mulating general policy.257 Although the Supreme Court has sug-
gested in dicta that an agency's choice of adjudication might, in some
circumstances, constitute an abuse of discretion,5 ' the federal courts
have not required agencies to make general rules only through
rulemaking procedures, thus eschewing what scholars call "required
rulemaking."259 As a result, some federal agencies-the National La-
bor Relations Board (NLRB), most notably-implement their statu-
tory mandate primarily through adjudication.260  Those agencies
conduct few rulemaking proceedings because they formulate general
policy in adjudication. 61
The situation is quite different in Maryland. Although the Court
of Appeals initially endorsed the federal approach, 262 it ultimately
254. See id.
255. See id. At the very least, that reform should encourage removing references to su-
perseded statutes and regulations from COMAR.
256. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 575 A.2d 324, 326-28 (Md. 1990)
(departing from the federal standard granting agencies broad discretion to choose be-
tween rulemaking and adjudication).
257. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (upholding the authority of
agencies to formulate "new standards of conduct" in adjudication); see also NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (upholding authority of agency to announce "new
principles" in adjudicatory proceedings).
258. See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294. The Bell Aerospace Court did not specify what
those circumstances might be. Id.
259. I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 50, at § 6.8, at 266-73.
260. See Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41
DuKE L.J. 274, 274, 276 n.8 (1991). The NLRB adopted its first substantive rule in 1989.
See id. at 276.
261. See, e.g., id. at 274-76 (describing NLRB's virtually exclusive use of adjudication to
make policy).
262. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 501 A.2d 1307, 1319 (Md.
1986) ("'[T]he choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency.'" (quoting Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203)).
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adopted a strikingly different methodology in CBS, Inc. v. Comptroller of
the Treasury.2 16 In that case, the Comptroller, in auditing CBS's 1980
and 1981 tax returns, applied for the first time an audience-share
method to determine the proportion of CBS's network advertising
revenue that was taxable in Maryland. 211 The Comptroller's "new pol-
icy"265 increased CBS's tax liability. The court found that application
of the Comptroller's new policy was invalid because it "amounted to a
change in a generally applicable rule" that "had to be promulgated
pursuant to the rulemaking procedures of the APA."266
The CBS decision broadly requires agencies to use rulemaking
procedures to formulate general policy. Although the court empha-
sized that the Comptroller's new policy reflected a change,2 67 the
court's reasoning applies with equal force to agency policies that are
truly new. The court invoked the advantages of rulemaking-pro-
spective effect and greater public participation 26 -and favorably
cited out-of-state precedent interpreting similar APA provisions to
mandate rulemaking "when the agency action falls within the statu-
tory definition of 'rule' or 'regulation.'" 269 That a new policy repre-
sents a significant change does not appear to determine whether
rulemaking is required. The Attorney General rightly framed the ba-
sic inquiry in a broader fashion: "Is the agency's action a prospective
exercise in policymaking that will have a significant effect on a mem-
ber of the public, including members of a regulated industry? If so,
the APA's rulemaking requirement applies."27 0 Applying that test, the
Attorney General advised the Racing Commission that authorizing
Arabian racing at licensed tracks required a regulation.27 1
The Attorney General also recognized that identifying changes in
policy is often a difficult task.272 For example, the Attorney General
was unsure whether permitting Arabian racing constituted a change
263. 575 A.2d 324 (Md. 1990).
264. Id. at 325.
265. Id. at 330.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 328 ("the change must be accompanied by rulemaking").
268. Id. at 328.
269. Id. at 327. The lead precedent, cited by the CBS court, is Megdal v. Oregon State
Board of DentalExaminers, 605 P.2d 273, 287 (Or. 1980) (holding that revocation of dentist's
license for making intentional misrepresentations was erroneous where agency had not
adopted a rule proscribing this conduct).
270. 72 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 313, 320 (1987).
271. Id. In an earlier opinion, the Attorney General had advised the Racing Commis-
sion that it could not award Sunday racing dates at Maryland tracks without first adopting a
regulation allowing Sunday racing. See 65 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 396 (1980) (cited favorably
by the CBS court, 575 A.2d at 328).
272. See 72 Md. Op. Att'y Gen., at 321.
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in policy if there had been no "conscious policy" of the Commission
prohibiting it."' Likewise, the policy change identified by the CBS
court was problematic at best. The Comptroller, in previous audits of
the network's tax returns, had done nothing to attribute any of its
advertising revenues to Maryland. 74 That informal practice, not re-
flected in any regulation or adjudicatory decision, was, in the eyes of
the court, the changed "policy." 75 The presence of change, there-
fore, seems less important than the general applicability of the new
policy in determining whether rulemaking is required. As the CBS
court recognized, rulemaking is not necessary if the Comptroller ad-
justs his policy to the "peculiar or unusual circumstances that apply to
a particular taxpayer.,2
76
Maryland's required rulemaking doctrine has also had a
profound effect on adjudication. In Maryland, policy issues do not
arise in adjudication as often as in federal administrative law. Agency
counsel, invoking a long line of Attorney General opinions, 77 advise
that issues of general policy must be resolved through rulemaking. As
a result, the focus of adjudication changes; decisionmakers tend to
interpret and apply Maryland regulations rather than determine what
is sensible policy under the statute. Like all generalizations, this one is
subject to exceptions. Agency regulations are often vague or do not
address all relevant issues. Certainly, one cannot eliminate all poli-
cymaking from adjudication; but even in initial licensing, the most
policy-oriented category of adjudication, decisionmakers in Maryland
tend to focus on whether the applicant satisfies the applicable regula-
tions. Thus, in reviewing applications for certificates of need, the
Health Resources Planning Commission focuses on applying the State
Health Plan. 7 8 Similarly, in issuing air quality permits, the Depart-
273. See id. at 320.
274. CBS, 575 A.2d at 325, 328-29.
275. Id. at 329. The court also noted that there was "no showing that this policy was only
applied to CBS." Id.
276. Id. at 330 n.5. The Court of Appeals recently held that rulemaking is not necessary
if a new rule formulated by an agency lacks widespread application. See Department of
Health & Mental Hygiene v. Chimes, Inc., 681 A.2d 484, 489 (Md. 1996).
277. See opinions cited supra notes 270, 271. A more recent opinion, issued in 1991,
advises the Board of Physical Therapists to determine by regulation whether physical ther-
apists could perform certain procedures. See 76 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 91-003, 11 (Jan. 23,
1991); see also 78 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 93-044, 263, 269 (Nov. 8, 1993) (concluding regula-
don is required to change eligibility criteria).
278. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07H (1994); see also 22:17 Md. Reg. 1347, 1356
(1995) (proposed MD. REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 24.01.07G).
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ment of the Environment seeks to avoid open-ended issues not ad-
dressed by agency regulations. 79
This shift from policymaking by adjudication to policymaking by
rulemaking somewhat rationalizes the Maryland APA's bifurcated re-
view provisions. Under those provisions, final decisions in contested
cases are reviewable for both legality and rationality, but regulations
are reviewable only for legality; the court does not determine whether
substantial evidence supports the regulation or whether it is arbitrary
or capricious. 8 ° Proponents of a unitary system argue that the scope
of review should not depend on the nature of the proceeding but on
the nature of the issue-whether it is one of fact, law, application, or
discretion. 2 1 For example, an agency's imposition of a new require-
ment on a regulated trade or profession should not be subject to ra-
tionality review if accomplished through adjudication, but be subject
only to review for legality if adopted by rulemaking.8 2 That argu-
ment, however, loses a good deal of its force if, as appears to be the
case in Maryland, the required rulemaking doctrine causes agencies
to resolve most policy issues through rulemaking. s3 Because the
agency must adopt new policy through regulations not subject to ra-
tionality review, the reviewability of an agency's policy determination
does not depend on the agency's choice of rulemaking or adjudica-
tion. Maryland thus achieves uniformity by excluding the check of
judicial review.
It is, nevertheless, a close question whether the factual and policy
bases for regulations should be subject to rationality review in the
courts. Proponents might argue that the availability of judicial review
would improve the quality of agency decisionmaking. Before adopt-
ing a regulation, an agency should gather information, consider rele-
vant factors, and articulate, at least for itself, the reasons for its
action.2 8 4 Most agency rulemakers do that today, but persons ad-
279. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 11.02.02 (1995) (listing criteria for granting of air
quality permits).
280. See supra notes 79-82, 125-130 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., Donald W. Brodie & Hans A. Linde, State Court Review of Administrative
Action: Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARiz. ST. L.J. 537, 546-50 (discussing standards of
review for these issues).
282. See William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L.
Rrv. 147, 169-70 (1991).
283. See supra notes 235-238, 262-276 and accompanying text.
284. See ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 6.10.1, at 309
(1986). Maryland's APA does not even require agencies to publish an explanatory state-
ment on the agency's reasons for adopting a rule. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 10-101
to -139 (1995). Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994) (requiring publication of an explanatory state-
ment); 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33, § 3-110 (requiring a concise explanatory statement).
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versely affected by a regulation have no mechanism available for chal-
lenging an agency's refusal to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.
Although the AELR Committee sometimes does intervene, that review
process is political, and an aggrieved person has no right to force the
Committee to act.2 85
Rationality review of regulations appears workable even though
the facts supporting the regulation will be legislative, rather than adju-
dicative. The agency should gather relevant facts in preparing its no-
tice of proposed rulemaking and in conducting the public rulemaking
proceeding. Thus, the agency should have a record to present to the
reviewing court.286 Take, for example, the Department of Natural Re-
sources regulation prohibiting the operation of personal watercraft in
Maryland waters by any person who is less than fourteen years old.287
That regulation easily survived review for legality in the Court of Ap-
peals;2s8 the court rejected challenges based on the nondelegation
doctrine and lack of statutory authority.289 Although the court did
not review the regulation for rationality, one would hope that the rec-
ord before the agency2 9° amply demonstrated that there was substan-
tial evidence to support the regulation-that a reasoning mind
reasonably could have reached the same conclusion."9 Courts, of
course, do not normally subject statutes to rationality review when de-
termining their constitutionality; rather, the court presumes the exist-
ence of justifying facts and requires the challenger to establish that
285. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
286. It is a close question whether the agency rulemaking record should be the exclusive
record for judicial review. The Federal APA so provides in 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994). See Nova
Scotia Food Prods. Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that for
informal rulemakingjudicial review should focus on existing agency record). But see 1981
MSAPA, supra note 33, §§ 3-112(c), 5-114(a)(3) (allowing a reviewing court to hear new
evidence).
287. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 8, § 18.02.05A (1995).
288. See Christ v. Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources, 644 A.2d 34, 42 (Md. 1994)
("[T]his Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of administrative regulations
reflecting policy determinations which have been just as 'fundamental' as the age restric-
tion embodied in the [boating regulation].").
289. See id. at 40.
290. The Department had received numerous complaints, ran tests, and held public
hearings. See id at 36 n.4.
291. Under the Federal APA, substantial evidence review only applies to formal, on-the-
record proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). For informal proceedings (including most
rulemaking), the standard of review is whether the agency action is "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. § 706(2) (A). When
applied to questions of fact, that standard closely resembles substantial evidence review.
See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677,
683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that "there is no substantive difference").
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those facts do not exist.29 2 The courts' refusal to review for rationality
seems appropriate for statutes promulgated by a democratically
elected legislature; it seems less so for regulations or other exercises of
delegated authority.293
In contrast, ossification of the federal rulemaking process demon-
strates that rationality review of regulations has its costs. 29 4 That un-
happy experience makes it unlikely that the Maryland legislature will
change the present system of bifurcated review. This is hardly an irra-
tional choice. 29 5 In non-APA cases, the Court of Appeals has similarly
limited review of agency action that is legislative in nature.296 The
judiciary's role "is limited to assessing whether the agency was acting
within its legal boundaries. "297 Under this "legal boundaries" review,
the court decides all relevant questions of law, including the scope of
the agency's authority, but does not review the agency's action to de-
termine if "it is arbitrary or capricious or unsupported by substantial
evidence."" 8 Those grounds of review-which may be considered ra-
tionality review-apply only if the agency action is adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial. 299 Thus, in Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc.,300 the court
restricted its review of a Division of Labor and Industry regulation
292. See Maryland Aggregates Ass'n v. State, 655 A.2d 886, 892 (Md.), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1965 (1995).
293. The Christ opinion may express some concern over rationality review when it rea-
sons that "[S] ome age restriction ... would seem to be absolutely necessary." Christ; 644
A.2d at 41-42 (emphasis added). The reference to "some" suggests the question-why age
14? Why not 15 or 13? Any line drawn has a certain arbitrary quality, but a line at any of
those age limits would appear reasonable. Perhaps a court committed, or overcommitted,
to review of arbitrariness or capriciousness might require the agency to demonstrate that it
had considered alternative age limitations or even that the age limitation chosen was the
best one. Such intensive review seems excessive. To prevent it, one might limit rationality
review, as did the 1981 Model State APA in an optional provision, to substantial evidence
review of factual determinations. See supra text accompanying notes 142-144. That ap-
proach eliminates review for arbitrariness and capriciousness of agency exercises of
discretion.
294. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
295. A majority of the states do not afford rationality review of rules. See Funk, supra
note 282, at 134-35 (identifying only 13 states that provide such review).
296. See Weiner v. Maryland Ins. Admin., 652 A.2d 125, 129 (Md. 1995) (quoting De-
partment of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 334 A.2d 514, 523 (Md.
1975) (limiting review of agency action that is legislative in nature)). Wener involved the
approval of a rate filing. Id. at 126-27.
297. Id. at 129.
298. Judy v. Schaefer, 627 A.2d 1039, 1053 (Md. 1993) (involving appropriations reduc-
tion by Governor).
299. See Weiner, 652 A.2d at 129 (finding grounds apply when agency acting in quasi-
judicial capacity (quoting Linchester, 334 A.2d at 523)); Judy, 627 A.2d at 1053 (finding
grounds do not apply because action is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial).
300. 654 A.2d 449, 456 (Md. 1995).
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prohibiting smoking in workplaces to a determination of whether the
agency stayed within "legal boundaries," notwithstanding the applica-
ble statute's explicit mandate of substantial evidence review. 0 1
The Court of Appeals's model for review of quasi-legislative
agency action is consistent with the limited review of regulations avail-
able under the APA's declaratory judgment section. The court errs,
however, when it suggests, as in H & G Restaurant, that the Separation
of Powers provision in the Maryland Declaration of Rights °2 bars the
legislature from requiring stricter review of agency regulations.10 3
While the court is correct in asserting that the legislature may not
confer upon courts the authority to substitute the court's judgment
for the agency's legislative determination,30 4 rationality review, prop-
erly understood, does not permit the court to do so. In State Insurance
Commissioner v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,30 5 the court re-
viewed the legislative determinations of the Insurance Commissioner
under a statutorily mandated preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard'0 6 and correctly concluded that the legislature had not con-
ferred upon the court "a too intense right of review.""0 7 A court could
perform its legislatively assigned task because preponderance of the
evidence review, like substantial evidence review, did not allow substi-
tuted judgment.30 1 Rather, when reviewing under either a substantial
evidence or a preponderance of the evidence standard, the court's
role "should be limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could
have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. This need
not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of
judicial judgment for agency judgment. "309
The Court of Appeals thus erred in H & G Restaurant when it
refused to subject the Division's regulation to substantial evidence re-
view."10 The Division promulgated the regulation, which prohibited
301. Id. The statute was MD. CODE ANN., LABOR & EMPL. § 5-215(c) (1991).
302. Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights reads:
That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be
forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the func-
tions of one of said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any
other.
MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 8.
303. H & G Restaurant, 654 A.2d at 455.
304. Id. at 456; see Weiner, 652 A.2d at 229.
305. 236 A.2d 282 (Md. 1967).
306. Id. at 288.
307. Id. at 287.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 292.
310. H & G Restaurant, 654 A.2d at 455.
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smoking in workplaces, under Maryland's Occupational Safety and
Health Act,3 1 ' and as the court recognized, that Act provided the "ap-
propriate standards of review. "312 Those standards included substan-
tial evidence review. 13 Nevertheless, the court concluded:
The "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review, as set
forth in § 5-215(c) (2), namely, whether a reasoning mind
could have reached the factual conclusions the agency
reached, is inapplicable as our prior cases indicate where the
agency is acting in a quasi-legislative mode in considering
and adopting regulations within the boundaries of its rule-
making authority.3
14
The H & G Restaurant court relied on earlier cases involving legislative
determinations by zoning boards315 and, in one case, by the Baltimore
Commissioner of Health.3" 6 Those cases addressed the constitutional
limits on the exercise of the police power and not the reviewability of
agency action under the APA or other statute; thus, given the legisla-
tive nature of the agency action challenged, the Court of Appeals
treated the agency's action as presumptively correct.31 7 That ap-
proach-requiring notice, hearing, and evidentiary support only for
311. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-314(c) (1991).
312. H & G Restaurant 654 A.2d at 455 (citing MD. CODE ANN., IaB. & EMPL. § 5-
215(c)).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 456 (emphasis added). By "inapplicable," the court must have meant uncon-
stitutional; there is no other possible basis for the court's refusal to follow the legislature's
command.
315. See Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 376 A.2d 483 (Md. 1972);
Storch v. Zoning Bd., 298 A.2d 8 (Md. 1972); Crown Cent. Petroleum v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 265 A.2d 192 (Md. 1970).
316. See Givner v. Commissioner of Health, 113 A.2d 899 (Md. 1954). The H & G Res-
taurant court also relied on Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp.,
334 A.2d 514 (Md. 1975). H & G Restaurant, 645 A.2d at 455. In that oft-cited case, the
court struck down, on separation of powers grounds, a statute requiring independentjudi-
cial fact-finding-substitution of judgment-on the grant or denial of wetlands permits.
Linchester, 334 A.2d at 521. The Linchester court did suggest that the scope of review of
agency action legislative in nature was "limited to assessing whether the agency was acting
within its legal boundaries (not an issue here)." Id. at 523. As the Linchester court explicitly
noted, that statement was no more than dictum; in its support, the court cited the same
line of cases invoked by the H & G Restaurant court. Id.
317. See Woodward & Lothrop, 376 A.2d at 495 (stating that legislative acts undergo nar-
row, arbitrary or ultra vires review and noting presumption of validity of zoning board's
actions); Storch, 298 A-2d at 14 (same); Crown Cent. Petroleum, 265 A.2d at 196-97 (conclud-
ing zoning board acting in legislative or quasi-legislative capacity will be upheld if a reason-
able factual basis supports board's action, even if the board acted with no evidence and
noting heavy presumption of constitutionality); Givner, 113 A.2d at 903 (noting that review
of health board's action is only for arbitrary, illegal, or unreasonable acts).
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adjudicatory action 3 18 -is appropriate if the legislature has not spo-
ken. But National Bureau makes clear that the legislature can require
courts to perform substantial evidence or similar rationality review of
agency regulations.3 19 The legislature had so provided in the Mary-
land Occupational Safety and Health Act, 20 and the H & G Restaurant
court should have respected that choice. 21
III. ADJUDICATION AND THE MARYLAND APA
A. Relationship Between Adjudication and Contested Case
The Maryland APA's trial-type hearing procedures apply to all
agencies that "adjudicate contested cases."32 Although it follows that
all contested cases are adjudications, it does not follow that all adjudi-
cations are contested cases. A proceeding must satisfy two require-
ments under the APA to qualify as a contested case. 3  First, the
318. This approach appears most clearly in Mayor of Baltimore v. Biermann, 50 A.2d 804
(Md. 1947). There, the court held that the legislative determinations of zoning authorities
are presumptively correct, "even if the legislative body acted without evidence at all." Id. at
808. To obtain relief, aggrieved property owners had to show that the challenged action
exceeded the police power or deprived them of property without due process. Id.
319. The Court of Appeals has followed National Bureau in performing substantial evi-
dence review of legislative determinations by the Insurance Commissioner (now the Mary-
land Insurance Administrator) and the Health Services Cost Review Commission. See
Johns Hopkins Hosp., Inc. v. Insurance Comm'r, 488 A.2d 942, 945 (Md. 1985); Prince
George's Doctors' Hosp., Inc. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 486 A.2d 744, 748
(Md. 1985); Maryland Fire Underwriters Rating Bureau v. Insurance Comm'r, 272 A.2d 24,
27-28 (Md. 1971); see also Lubman v. Insurance Comm'r, 585 A.2d 269, 273 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991) (holding that the Insurance Commissioner reached a factual conclusion not
based on a preponderance of the evidence).
320. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-215(c) (2) (1991).
321. Despite its explicit refusal to apply the statute, the H & G Restaurant court did
engage in considerable rationality review. For example, the court found "abundant scien-
tific evidence in the record" to support the agency's conclusions on the health hazards
posed by environmental tobacco smoke. H & G Restaurant, 654 A.2d at 458.
322. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(b)(1) (1995).
323. Id. § 10-202(d). That definition reads in full:
(d) Contested case.-(1) "Contested case" means a proceeding before an agency to
determine:
(i) a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or privilege of a person that is required
by statute or constitution to be determined only after an opportunity for an
agency hearing; or
(ii) the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, or amendment of a li-
cense that is required by statute or constitution to be determined only after
an opportunity for an agency hearing.
(2) "Contested case" does not include a proceeding before an agency in-
volving an agency hearing required only by regulation unless the regu-
lation expressly, or by clear implication, requires the hearing to be
held in accordance with this subtitle.
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proceeding must be of particular applicability-the agency must
"determine" 24 (adjudicate) "a right, duty, statutory entitlement, or
privilege of a person" or "the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, sus-
pension, or amendment of a license."325 Second, a "statute or
constitution"3 26 or a "regulation"3 27 must require the agency to make
such a determination "only after an opportunity for an agency hear-
ing."32 ' Thus, the statutory definition of a contested case does not
itself grant a right to a contested case hearing; that right must come
from an external source-either some other statutory provision,329
constitutional principles, or an agency regulation. In the case of hear-
ings required by regulation, contested case procedures only apply
when the regulation "expressly, or by clear implication,"330 requires
the hearing to be held in accordance with the contested case
subtitle.3 3'
Maryland's APA thus adopts an "intermediate" approach in deter-
mining the relationship between adjudication and the APA's hearing
provisions.3 32 An adjudication is not a "contested case" unless a stat-
324. Id.
325. Id. § 10-202(d)(1)(i)-(ii).
326. Id.
327. Id. § 10-202(d) (2).
328. Id. § 10-202(d)(1)(i)-(ii).
329. The statutory source is usually not part of the APA, but at least one section of the
APA does appear to confer hearing rights. See id. § 10-226(c) (providing that an agency
cannot suspend or revoke a license without first giving the licensee notice and an opportu-
nity for a hearing); see also Maryland Racing Comm'n v. Castrenze, 643 A.2d 412, 418 (Md.
1994) (concluding that "the General Assembly intended that an administrative agency
could not suspend a license without first giving the licensee... an opportunity to be heard
in the matter"). The Court of Appeals thus misspoke when it stated that "the APA itself
does not grant a right to a hearing." Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Northeast Md. Waste Dis-
posal Auth., 594 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Md. 1991). What the court meant to say was that the
APA's definition of a "contested case" does not itself grant a right to a hearing.
330. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(d) (2).
331. The contested case provisions in the original Maryland APA applied to all hearings
.required by law or constitutional right." MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 244(c) (1957). When
the APA became part of the State Government Article, the Revisor substituted "required by
law" for "required by law or constitutional right." MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-
201(c) (1984) (Revisor's Note). The Court of Appeals subsequently interpreted that lan-
guage to cover hearings required by "a statute, a regulation, or due process principles."
Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Northeast Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 594 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Md.
1991). The present definition of contested case derives from the recommendations of the
Tiburzi Commission. See TIBURZI COMMISSION INITAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 25. The
Commission found the term "law" to be ambiguous and substituted the phrase "statute or
constitution." Id. The present definition also treats separately hearings required by regula-
tion to allow agencies to grant parties a contested case hearing even though not required
to do so by constitution or statute. See id.
332. Professor Asimow uses the terms "maximum," "intermediate," and "minimum" to
describe the three principal alternatives from which legislatures must choose when decid-
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ute, constitution, or agency regulation confers a right to a hearing
and thus triggers contested case procedures.3 33 By contrast, the "max-
imum" approach, adopted by the 1981 Model State APA, ensures that
all agency adjudication falls under the APA; an agency must conduct
an "adjudicative proceeding" under the Act whenever it formulates an
order of particular applicability that determines "the legal rights, du-
ties, privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more
specific persons." s3 1 The maximum approach thus requires an agency
to follow APA procedures whenever it adjudicates, regardless of
whether some other statute or due process principles require a hear-
ing. The 1981 Model State APA recognizes, however, that in some
adjudications the interests at stake may not be important enough to
warrant formal procedures. It, therefore, creates four distinct proce-
dural models: formal adjudicative hearings, conference adjudicative
hearings, emergency adjudicative proceedings, and summary adjudi-
cative proceedings.3 "5 The formal adjudicative hearing resembles the
contested case model; the other models allow agencies to adopt less
formal procedures where a full, trial-type process is not
336appropriate.
The "minimum" approach, in contrast, limits contested case pro-
cedures to adjudications where a statute requires the opportunity for a
hearing.337 A prime example is the Federal APA, which adopts the
minimum approach to formal adjudication-the federal equivalent of
a contested case. Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the Federal Act re-
quire trial-type procedures for formal adjudication,3 3 8 but those sec-
tions apply only to "adjudication required by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.13 3 9 That text
makes no mention of hearings required by the Constitution 4 ° and
ing what adjudication to subject to APA hearing provisions. Asimow, supra note 230, at
1082.
333. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(d).
334. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33, § 1-102(5).
335. Id. §§ 4-202 to -221 (formal adjudicative hearings); § 4-402 (conference adjudica-
tive hearings); § 4-501 (emergency adjudicative proceedings); § 4-503 (summary adjudica-
tive proceedings).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 225-229.
337. Asimow, supra note 230, at 1082.
338. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (1994).
339. Id. § 554(a).
340. Shortly after the Act's enactment, the Supreme Court, in a deportation case, inter-
preted a hearing "required by statute" to include a hearing required by "more than statu-
tory authority"-a hearing required by the Federal Constitution. Wong Yang Sung v.
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950). That holding has "fallen into
obscurity" following the "due process explosion" of the 1970s, which extended hearing
rights to protect many less important interests. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHOR' &
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specifies that any hearing required by statute must be "on the record"
to trigger formal adjudicatory procedures.3 41 As a result, there is now
a large body of federal informal adjudication not governed by APA
hearing provisions. The Federal APA does not specify the proce-
dures that agencies must follow in these informal adjudications, but
the Act's unitary judicial review provision applies to both formal and
informal adjudication." 3 Judicial review under the Federal APA is,
therefore, available even though the agency does not conduct a hear-
ing under the APA.'
The situation in Maryland is quite different. Informal adjudica-
tion does not comprise a recognized category of proceedings. It does
occur, but agencies have not developed informal hearing procedures
for adjudications that are not contested cases. In addition, the APA's
judicial review section applies only to final decisions in contested
cases.345 There is, however, a good deal of agency adjudication
(mostly formal) that is expressly exempted from the APA's contested
case subtitle.3 ' Final decisions in informal adjudications, or in adju-
dications conducted by exempt agencies, are reviewable only under
BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 375 (9th ed. 1995). While never overruled, Wong Yang Sung
has had little impact on the scope of formal adjudication under the Federal APA. See, e.g.,
Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that prison disciplinary
proceedings are not formal adjudications even though the Constitution requires a
hearing).
341. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a). The Supreme Court has never resolved what statutory hearing
rights are sufficient to trigger formal adjudication. The Courts of Appeals are hopelessly
divided. Compare Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 877 (1st Cir.
1978) (holding that a statutory right to a "public hearing" suffices), with Chemical Waste
Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding agency's interpreta-
tion that required "public hearing" did not trigger formal adjudication). Recent decisions
appear to favor the approach of the Chemical Waste Mnmt. court. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra
note 50, § 8. 2, at 386-89.
342. See PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMNISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVEJUDICIARY 859 (1992). According to this
Administrative Conference Study, the corps of non-ALJ federal adjudicators (often called
administrative judges or AJs) is almost twice the size of the ALJ corps. See id. at 789. AJs
also decide more cases, but do so "with less prestige, compensation, and job security." Id.
at 788. For an earlier description of informal adjudication by non-ALJs, see Verkuil, supra
note 223, at 757-75.
343. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. In informal adjudication, an agency must observe whatever
procedures its enabling act requires, plus due process principles. Id. § 706. For the effect
ofjudicial review on the procedures which an agency must follow, see supra text accompa-
nying note 50.
344. 5 U.S.C. § 702 ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action... is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
345. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(a) (1995).
346. For the list of exempt agencies, see supra note 99. The federal APA does not ex-
empt named agencies. While section 554(a) of the federal APA does exempt certain func-
tions, such as military and foreign affairs functions, from the requirements of formal
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some other express statutory provision or under the courts' inherent
power to "review and correct" agency action "which is arbitrary, illegal,
capricious or unreasonable."" 7
Whether or not an adjudication is a contested case thus affects
the review available. Informal adjudication poses a particular prob-
lem because the legislature, having declined to provide hearing rights,
is unlikely to authorize judicial review. Therefore, the only review
available is under the courts' inherent power. The Court of Appeals
has asserted that the scope of inherent power review is "essentially the
same" as that available under the APA.s  That dictum surely reflects
a concern that the scope of review should not depend on whether an
adjudication is a contested case; it also finds considerable support in
the case law. In original actions for certiorari and mandamus, courts
review agency action for both legality 49 and rationality;... that review
most likely occurs on the administrative record, rather than on a
court-compiled record.3 5 ' Nevertheless, some features of inherent-
power review differ significantly from judicial review under the APA.
For example, governmental entities cannot invoke inherent-power re-
adjudication, those exemptions are less important than the rulemaking exemptions found
in section 553.
347. Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Gould, 331 A.2d 55, 65 (Md. 1975). Judicial
review of agency action is not available unless explicitly authorized by statute. See Urbana
Civic Ass'n v. Urbana Mobile Village, Inc., 272 A.2d 628, 630 (Md. 1971). However, in the
absence of statute, one may invoke the courts' "inherent power" through an original action
for mandamus, certiorari, injunction, or declaratory judgment. Gould, 331 A.2d at 65-71.
The latter remedy is not available when statutory review is available. See State Dep't of
Assessments & Taxation v. Clark, 380 A.2d 28, 38 (Md. 1977).
348. Medical Waste Assocs., Inc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc., 612 A.2d 241, 248
(Md. 1992). For similar assertions by the Court of Special Appeals, see Harford Memorial
Hospital v. Health Servims Cost Review Commission, 410 A.2d 22, 32 (Md. C. Spec. App. 1980)
(inherent power review "goes very little beyond" review for illegality or arbitrary and capri-
cious action) and Hurl v. Board of Education, 667 A.2d 970, 979 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)
(stating that inherent power review is essentially the same as review under the APA).
349. See, e.g., Silverman v. Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 563 A.2d 402, 411-12 (Md.
1989) (following Gould in action for mandamus); Gould, 331 A.2d at 76 (concluding case
was application for certiorari and stating that misinterpretations of law not within agency's
discretion and are illegal).
350. See Cicala v. Disability Review Bd., 418 A.2d 205 (Md. 1980) (action for manda-
mus). The Cicala court stated that "one of the ways in which an administrative agency acts
arbitrarily is to reach a decision which is not based upon or supported by facts in the
record." Id. at 209; see also Dickinson-Tidewater, Inc. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 329 A.2d
18, 25 (Md. 1974) (holding that the substantial evidence test applies to inherent power
review).
351. See Cicala, 418 A.2d at 209. Prior to Cca/a circuit courts often heard evidence to
determine if the agency acted arbitrarily. See, e.g., State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 209
A.2d 555, 561 (Md. 1965) (holding that evidence presented to circuit court established
agency decision not supported by substantial evidence). Certiorari review is by definition
on the record.
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view.3 12 Further, it is unclear whether a private party seeking inher-
ent-power review must invoke a personal or property right.353 In
addition, a court rule requires a party to bring a review action under
the APA or other statutory provision within thirty days of the agency's
decision;354 as a result, agencies sometimes prefer to adjudicate
through contested case procedures in order to foreclose court chal-
lenges brought after the thirty-day period. 55
B. Overview of Adjudication in Maryland
In Maryland, most agency adjudication falls into one of two cate-
gories. The first consists of contested cases subject to trial-type pro-
cess and judicial review under the APA. In these proceedings, an ALJ
normally conducts the hearing and renders either a final decision or a
proposed decision for the agency to review. 5 6 Most contested case
hearings, therefore, occur at the OAH, but a limited number of agen-
cies subject to the contested case subtitle may use their own hearing
examiners. 35 7 The second category includes adjudications involving
agencies exempt from the APA's contested case subtitle. These pro-
ceedings are not contested cases, but private parties obtain equivalent
352. See Board of Educ. v. Secretary of Personnel, 562 A.2d 700, 706 (Md. 1989) (ex-
plaining that mandamus cases "all involve claims of personal rights or property rights of
private individuals or entities" rather than government officials or agencies). Under the
APA, however, local governmental units have the same rights as private persons. MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-204 (1995).
353. See Gould, 221 A.2d at 68-71. The Gould court held that a claimant's satisfying the
statutory qualifications for compensation constituted a "sufficient 'personal right.'" Id. at
71 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 5 (1973)). APA review is available to an "aggrieved
party." For a discussion of that standing requirement, see infra text accompanying notes
497-520.
354. MD. R. 7-203(a) (1996).
355. See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Friendship Heights, 468
A.2d 1353, 1357 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (holding that a three-year period of limitations
for mandamus action would compromise agency's approval of site plan). In addition, if
review is available under the APA, an aggrieved party must exhaust that remedy. SeePrince
George's County v. Blumberg, 418 A.2d 1155, 1160 (Md. 1980).
356. See OrncE OF ADMINiSTRATivE HEARINGS, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1996) [hereinaf-
ter 1995 OAH ANNuAL REPORT].
357. The principal agencies in this category are the Comptroller of the Treasury (tax
assessments and licensing), the Health Services Cost Review Commission (hospital
ratemaking), and the Health Resource Planning Commission (issuance of certificates of
need for health care facilities). See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 9-1601 (a), discussed
supra note 102. Section 9-1601(a) also allows hearing examiners in the Department of
Labor, Licensing and Regulation to conduct contested case hearings on unemployment
insurance claims. See id. These proceedings are subject to most, but not all, of the provi-
sions in the contested case subtitle. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8-501 to -510
(1991 & Supp. 1996) (providing procedures for conduct of hearings before Board of Ap-
peals of the Department of Economic and Employment Development).
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trial-type process and judicial review, at least before the principal ex-
empt agencies.351 The exemptions, therefore, do not significantly in-
crease agency use of informal adjudicatory procedures.
In Maryland, there are few adjudicatory hearings that are less for-
mal than the contested case model. Most informal hearings that do
occur provide an administrative remedy that an aggrieved person
must exhaust prior to obtaining a contested case or other formal hear-
ing. 59 Thus, although in theory the Maryland APA adopts the inter-
mediate approach of providing a formal hearing only if a statute,
regulation, or due process principles require such a hearing, in prac-
tice Maryland follows the maximum approach of treating almost all
adjudicatory hearings conducted by nonexempt agencies as contested
cases.
The OAH's present workload reflects that practice. The OAH
conducts hearings for at least twenty different agencies administering
more than two hundred separate programs.36 ° In 1995, the OAH re-
ceived 43,442 cases and decided 29,170 by written decision.361 Those
358. The principal agencies in this category are the Maryland Tax Court, the Public
Service Commission, the Workers' Compensation Commission, and the Maryland Insur-
ance Administration (ratemaking functions). See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-
203(a) (3), discussed supra note 99. As a result of these exemptions, and of those
presented in the prior footnote, the OAH hears no tax or ratemaking cases. The OAH
does, however, following the legislature's adoption of the Tiburzi Commission's recom-
mendations, hear enforcement proceedings brought by the Maryland Insurance Adminis-
tration and challenges to determinations by the Administration on insurers' decisions to
cancel, not renew, reduce coverage, or increase a premium. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§§ 35, 240AA (1994) (providing that those proceedings are now contested cases and that
the Administrator must conduct the hearing personally or delegate that function to the
OAH).
359. Perhaps the most significant body of informal adjudication accompanies tax assess-
ments. See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. §§ 14-506 to -510 (1994) (providing for informal
hearings on real property tax assessments); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 13-508(c)-(d)
(Supp. 1995) (providing for informal hearings on various tax assessments by Comptroller
of the Treasury). These informal adjudications precede the more formal process available
to aggrieved taxpayers in the Maryland Tax Court. See MD. CODE ANN., TAX. PROP. § 14-
512; MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 13-510. Similarly, many agencies, prior to offering ag-
grieved persons a contested case hearing, provide more informal procedures for resolving
disputes. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 7-406(a) (1994) (providing an "informal
hearing" before the Secretary's designee on services for developmentally disabled); § 7-
406(b) (allowing the Secretary to review the decision of the informal hearing as a con-
tested case). These informal procedures do not determine private rights unless the losing
party chooses to forego the more formal procedures available.
360. See 1995 OAH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 356, at 9.
361. See id. at app. C. The number of cases received by the Office has dropped signifi-
cantly since 1990, its first full-year of operation. See OFrIcE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS,
1991 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 OAH ANNUAL REPORT] (approximately
67,500 cases received). The largest drop has been in motor vehicle cases. 1995 OAH AN-
NUAL REPORT, supra note 356, at 9. The OAH attributes the drop to the institution of
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figures place Maryland "in the vanguard" of central panel statesA62
Maryland's OAH apparently has the broadest jurisdiction and the
largest caseload of any central panel agency state. 63 Maryland's ALJs
render decisions in such diverse areas as occupational licensing, bene-
fits eligibility, civil rights, occupational safety and health, personnel,
special education, mental health, and environmental permitting and
enforcement3s To handle that caseload, the OAH employs fifty-nine
full-time ALJs, appointed by the chief ALJ and removable only for
cause.3 65 Prior to the creation of the OAH, state agencies employed
eighty-five full-time and five contractual hearing examiners to hear
contested cases.36 6 Those statistics indicate that the OAH's creation
has resulted in efficiencies. Its work has been justly praised.36 7
A number of factors explain the dominance of the contested case
model in Maryland. First, the legislature has been quite generous in
conferring hearing rights, particularly in occupational licensing and
government benefits cases. The legislature frequently specifies that
the required hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the con-
tested case subtitle of the APA.3 68 Only rarely does the legislature
specify that a required "hearing" shall not be a contested case hear-
ing. 69 Apparently, the legislature believes that the contested case
modest filing fees for most categories of cases (there was a particularly sharp drop in MVA
post-conviction cases) and to agency efforts, encouraged by the OAH, to settle more cases
before sending them to the OAH for a hearing. See id.
362. Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990's, 46 ADMIN. L.
REv. 75, 84 (1994).
363. See id. at 83. Judge Hoberg defines a central panel system as "an independent ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ) corps in which a central office of administrative hearings em-
ploys a staff of ALJs and assigns them, upon request of administrative agencies, to preside
over agency proceedings that are within the jurisdiction of the central office." Id. at 76.
There are central panels in at least sixteen jurisdictions. See Hardwicke, supra note 31, at
90-91.
364. See 1995 OAH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 356, at app. C.
365. See id. at 8.
366. See id.; see also Hoberg, supra note 362, at 81-82.
367. See Hoberg, supra note 362, at 84 (placing Maryland in the "vanguard" of states with
centralized administrative offices).
368. A Westlaw search of the 1995 Code discloses at least seventy-one sections in which
the legislature granted hearing rights and expressly required the agency to conduct the
hearing in accordance with the contested case subtitle of the APA.
369. In addition to the statutes providing an "informal hearing" as a prelude to formal
adjudication, see supra note 359, there are only eight such statutes. Three apply to the
Secretary of Budget and Fiscal Planning's resolution of disputes between local agencies
and the State over state retirement contributions. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 5-202.1 (c) (3),
16-403.1(c)(3), 23-403.1(c)(3) (1992). Three others have only limited application. MD.
CODE ANN., ENMR. § 5-906(e) (1996) (applying to permits for certain regulated activities
on nontidal wetlands); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 1-407(b) (Supp. 1995) (applying to
denials of trademark registrations by Secretary of State); MD. CODE ANN., FiN. INST. § 8-
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model best assures procedural fairness and judicial review. Second,
the Court of Appeals has been generous in interpreting statutes to
require contested case hearings. Where the legislature merely re-
quires a "hearing," but does not specify the type, the Court of Appeals
inquires whether the proceeding is an adjudication-whether the
agency is determining the rights, duties, statutory entitlements, or
privileges of specific persons or parties.3 70 If so, a statutory hearing
requirement triggers the contested case procedures, 71 unless some-
thing in the statutory scheme negates a contested case hearing.372
Thus, if a proceeding is adjudicatory, a statutorily required hearing is
presumptively a contested case hearing.17 3
A final factor explaining the dominance of the contested case
model is agencies' generosity in treating adjudicatory proceedings as
contested cases. Statutes delegating adjudicatory authority are some-
times silent on hearing rights.3 74 In addition, rather than refer to the
APA, statutes may ambiguously require a "public" hearing3 7 5 or un-
helpfully provide that any hearing required shall be conducted in ac-
cordance with the APA.176 In these instances, agencies often grant a
402(c) (7) (1992) (applying to emergency orders by Division of Savings and Loan Associa-
tions). For the two remaining statutes, see infra notes 425 and 435.
370. See, e.g., C.S. v. Prince George's County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 680 A.2d 470, 479 (Md.
1996) (determining the "nature of the hearing").
371. See id.; see also Donocam Assocs. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 489
A.2d 26, 31-32 (Md. 1985) (holding that "'the particular nature of the hearing required...
determines whether a matter is a contested case'" (quoting Donocam Assocs. v. Washing-
ton Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 471 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984))).
372. See Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Northeast Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 594 A.2d 1115,
1120 (Md. 1991).
373. This presumption readily explains the Department of Personnel's longstanding
practice to grant contested case hearings to employees in disciplinary and grievance pro-
ceedings. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Pans. §§ 2-301 to -302 (1994) (providing an employee's
right to a "hearing"). The State Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996 now
expressly requires the OAH to hear those cases in accordance with the contested case
subtitle of the APA. State Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996, ch. 347,
§ 11-110(C) (2), 1996 Md. Laws 2077, 2227.
374. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 14-301 to -309 (Supp. 1996) (certifi-
cation of minority business enterprises).
375. The statute before the court in Sugarloaf, 594 A.2d at 1122, is one example. That
statute required the Air Management Administration in the Department of the Environ-
ment to hold a "public hearing" before issuing a permit to construct certain pollution-
causing sources. Id. The court interpreted the statute to require a contested case hearing
at the construction permit stage. Id.
376. For example, the legislature has provided that the Board of Trustees of the State
Retirement System may hold hearings as necessary to perform its duties "[i]n addition to
any hearing that Title 10 of the State Government Act requires." MD. CODE ANN., STATE
PERS. § 21-111(b). Of course, Title 10 of the State Government Article-the APA--does
not require the Board to hold any hearings, although it does generally provide that "the
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contested case hearing by regulation or informal practice.3 77 Some-
times an agency may grant contested case hearings in response to a
concern that the affected party has a constitutional right to a hearing.
This appears to have been the basis for regulations granting contested
case hearings to aggrieved applicants for environmental permits.3 7,
Perhaps the agency reasoned that the applicant had a liberty interest,
protected by due process, in using her property as she saw fit. On
other occasions, an agency may grant contested case hearings because
agency counsel perceives advantages in doing so; contested case pro-
cedures provide a remedy that potential litigants need to exhaust and
produce a record that the agency can furnish a reviewing court, thus
avoiding a trial in the circuit court.3 79
The use of regulations as a source for contested case hearings led
the Tiburzi Commission to recommend that a regulation could not
serve that function unless it required a contested case hearing "ex-
pressly, or by clear implication."8 0 The Commission believed that al-
lowing agencies to negate the presumption that an adjudicatory
hearing is a contested case hearing would "encourage agencies to con-
sider granting some form of hearing rights in those situations in
which full APA hearing procedures are not necessary or appropri-
ate."381 Despite legislative enactment of that provision,"8 2 no agency
appears to have responded. In fact, the opposite trend continues.
For example, the Board of Trustees of the State Retirement and Pen-
sion System recently adopted regulations codifying the agency's prior
practice of treating disability and other retirement determinations as
contested cases.383
recipient of notice of an agency's action may have an opportunity to request a hearing."
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-207(b) (4) (1995).
377. See Warwick Corp. v. Department of Transp., 486 A.2d 224, 228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985) (holding that a hearing required by agency regulation was a contested case). Logi-
cally, a private party is unlikely to challenge an informal agency practice of granting con-
tested case hearings.
378. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene adopted a regulation so providing
in 1980. See 7:5 Md. Reg. 500, 512 (1980) (former MD. REGS. CODE tit. 18, § 18.02.03G).
The Department of the Environment had a similar regulation in the early 1990s. See infra
note 479.
379. See, e.g., State Dep't of Health v. Walker, 209 A.2d 555, 558 (Md. 1965) (indicating
that the circuit court had held a lengthy trial following the agency's denial of wetlands
permits without a hearing).
380. See TmuRzI COMMISSION INrrTIAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 25.
381. See id.
382. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(d)(2) (1995).
383. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 22, §§ 03.04.02(B) (3), 06.06.01A(1) (1996), adopted at 22:26
Md. Reg. 2031 (1995). The applicable statute is ambiguous on whether a hearing is re-
quired. See supra note 376.
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The Court of Appeals recently accentuated this trend in favor of
the contested case when it sharply limited the scope of the informal
adjudicatory procedures fashioned by the legislature for determining
the correctness of child abuse and neglect records."8 State law re-
quires local social services departments to investigate all reports of
child abuse or neglect."8 5 If the investigation does not rule out a find-
ing of abuse or neglect (the abuse or neglect is either "indicated" or
"unsubstantiated"), the local department must notify the alleged
abuser of her right to request an administrative hearing before an
ALJ. 6 The hearing is not a trial-type one; rather, the alleged abuser
receives notice of the local department's records (redacted to protect
confidential sources and persons whose life or safety might be endan-
gered by full disclosure), is permitted to make written submissions
and argument, and is entitled to a reasoned decision from the ALJ. 87
Quite plainly, the legislature did not intend these proceedings to be
contested cases .38  Although the Court of Appeals did not disagree
with that conclusion, it held that another statute38 9 required a con-
tested case hearing before the Department of Human Resources or a
local social services department could list an alleged abuser on a cen-
tral registry.39 0 According to the court, informal procedures were per-
missible for challenges to a department's investigatory finding, but
not if the party contested the entry of her name on a central
registry. 9
1
384. See C.S. v. Prince George's County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 680 A.2d 470, 478 (Md.
1996).
385. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-706 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
386. Id. §§ 5-706.1, -706.2. "Unsubstantiated" covers an intermediate category of cases
where there is insufficient evidence either to support a finding of "indicated" abuse or
neglect, or to rule out such a finding. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-701(v) (Supp. 1995).
387. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-706.2(c)-(d).
388. The Attorney General has so concluded. See 78 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 93-023, 137, 141
(June 26, 1993). The OAH conducted 878 of these non-APA hearings in 1994 and 856 in
1995. See Catherine M. Brennan, Abuse Suspects Win Day in Court, DAiLY REcoRD (Balti-
more), Aug. 1, 1996, at 10A. The ALJ renders the final agency decision.
389. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-715.
390. See C.S. v. Prince George's County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 680 A.2d 470, 478-79 (Md.
1996).
391. See id. at 475, 480. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the Department's
computerized data base, which includes investigatory findings, itself constitutes a central
registry. See id. at n.8. If it does, then the informal procedures developed by the legislature
would have little or no applicability. Cf Hodge v. Carroll County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812
F. Supp. 593, 603 (D. Md. 1992) (holding that the computerized data base is a central
registry), rev'd on other grounds sub noa. Hodge v.Jones, 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 581 (1994).
Adjudicating disputes over the correctness of child abuse and neglect records poses a
difficult challenge for the OAH, particularly if contested case procedures are necessary.
The number of such cases is significant, and the validity of the accusations often depends
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The contested case model has proved workable in Maryland, de-
spite the breadth of adjudication covered. Its success is attributable to
its flexibility and to the innovativeness of adjudicators. The OAH in
particular has adopted "flexible due process" as its basic credo.3 92 By
statute, nonattorney representation is permissible in a wide range of
proceedings;393 in addition, ALJs must observe all procedures re-
quired by federal or state law or regulation.3 94 The latter provision
allows (and, in actuality, requires) ALJs to apply the delegating
agency's procedural rules to supplement the OAH rules.393 For exam-
ple, in motor vehicle cases, ALJs apply the Department of Transporta-
tion regulation requiring subpoena requests for police and other
witnesses to contain a proffer of the witness's expected testimony and
its relevance to the proceeding. 96 Likewise, in inmate grievance
cases, ALJs apply Inmate Grievance Office regulations that limit the
availability of witnesses and the scope of review of prison disciplinary
determinations.3 97
The OAH's own rules of procedure39 ' also give ALJs considerable
flexibility in procedural matters. The rules are largely permissive on
such important subjects as the holding of prehearing conferences, 99
the summary disposition of cases in which there are no material facts
in dispute,"° the taking of official notice,"° and the mandatory sub-
mission of proof in written form. °2 Not surprisingly, the conduct of
contested cases, like the trial of civil cases, varies considerably from
case to case. Some proceedings are naturally less formal than
others.4 °3 In addition, the OAH offers settlement conferences and
mediation in certain areas in response to the inability of many parties
on the credibility of the accusers, including the alleged child victims. On the other hand,
the interests of the alleged abuser are considerable, and trial-type procedures may be nec-
essary to resolve the adjudicative facts in dispute.
392. OFFICE OF ADMNISTRATivE HEARINGS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1991).
393. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 9-1607.1 (1995).
394. Id. § 9-1607.2(b).
395. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 28, § 02.01.01C (1994) (providing that OAH "regulations
supplement the procedures required by law").
396. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 11, § 11.03.07A (1990). The Court of Appeals has found that
regulation to be compatible with the APA. See Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 630 A.2d
753, 765 (Md. 1993) (stating that evidence proffered at hearing "met both the statutory
and regulatory standards").
397. MD. CODE REGS. it. 12, §§ 07.01.08-07.01.09 (1995).
398. MD. CODE REGs. tit. 28 § 02.01 (1994).
399. Id. § 02.01.13A.
400. Id. § 02.01.16C(2).
401. Id. § 02.01.18F.
402. Id. § 02.01.18E.
403. Motor vehicle cases, roughly half the OAH's caseload, are among the less formal.
There is no agency presenter of fact, the driver is often the only witness, and the ALJ
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to take full advantage of formal procedures, 4 thus allowing ALJs to
resolve a significant number of disputes without a formal hearing." 5
However, settlement conferences and mediation do not always suc-
ceed, and they are not available in all contested-case proceedings. As
a result, ALJs sometimes conduct fairly protracted trial-type hearings
in cases where the private interests at stake appear to be relatively
minor.
The OAH's dominant role on the adjudicatory scene raises a fur-
ther question with respect to reviewing courts giving deference to
agency expertise. The 1957 Maryland APA authorized agencies to
"utilize their experience, technical competence and specialized
knowledge in the evaluation of the evidence presented to them." °6
In the first case to reach the Court of Appeals under the APA, the
court invoked that section to defer to the Real Estate Commission's
findings on the bad faith of realtors whose licenses the Commission
had suspended. °7 According to the Court of Appeals, a reviewing
court should not "substitute its judgment for the expertise of the ad-
ministrative agency from which the appeal is taken."4 "8 In at least
some cases, agency expertise has been determinative in the reviewing
court's upholding of agency findings of fact.40 9 When it last revisited
the APA in 1993, the legislature evidently believed that reviewing
courts should also consider OAH expertise.410 Thus, the General As-
normally renders a decision from the bench. See 1991 OAH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
361, at 3.
404. See 1995 OAH ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 356, at 11.
405. Settlement conferences are held in most personnel cases, with considerable suc-
cess; mediation is available in special education cases. See OFFICE OF ADMINISTrATIVE HEAR-
INcS, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9; 1995 OAH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 356, at 11. Both of
these initiatives received legislative endorsement in the General Assembly's 1996 session.
See Act of April 30, 1996, ch. 190, 1996 Md. Laws 1599, 1601 (amending MD. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. § 8-415(b) (allowing parents to seek mediation of special education disputes)); State
Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996, ch. 347, 1996 Md. Laws 2077, 2241
(adding MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. § 12-205(b) (2) (providing that the settlement of
grievances is the first option which should be examined)). The latter bill also creates in-
formal procedures as an alternative to contested case hearings in both disciplinary and
grievance proceedings. Id. at 2110 (adding MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. § 4-106 (establish-
ing peer review panels)).
406. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 252(d) (1957).
407. See Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm'n, 156 A.2d 657, 662 (Md. 1959).
408. See id. That reference to agency expertise subsequently became part of the Court
of Appeals's standard formulation of the substantial evidence test. See Bulluck v. Pelham
Wood Apts., 390 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Md. 1978) (citing Bernstein, 156 A.2d at 662).
409. See Howard County v. Davidsonville Area Civic & Potomac River Ass'n, 527 A.2d
772, 779 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (holding that agency expertise justified agency finding
that nitrogen removal from discharge was unnecessary).
410. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-213(i) (1995) (as amended by Act of April 13,
1993, ch. 59, 1993 Md. Laws 1017, 1031).
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sembly amended the original APA language quoted above to allow not
only agencies, but also the OAH, to use "experience, technical compe-
tence, and specialized knowledge" to evaluate evidence.4 n
The substitution of generalist central office ALJs for specialist
agency hearing examiners is nevertheless likely to reduce the role of
expertise. Despite the OAH's efforts to cross-train ALJs for all subject
matter areas in which they conduct hearings, ALJs are likely, in most
cases, to have less experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge than did the agency hearing examiners they replaced.
The legislature, when it chose the central panel system, favored inde-
pendence over expertise. However, this shift may have only a limited
impact in cases where the agency retains final decisional authority. In
those cases, it is the expert agency's findings that are subject to review;
ALJ findings in a proposed decision do not bind the agency unless
based on credibility evidence.412 In addition, agency staff, participat-
ing as witnesses or counsel, should be able to ensure that an adequate
record is built for the agency's final decision.
The situation is less clear when the ALJ makes the final agency
decision. Normally, it is the agency that chooses whether to delegate
authority to make a proposed or a final decision, but the legislature
recently gave the OAH final decisional authority in personnel41 3 and
special education cases.414 In those cases, a reviewing court is unlikely
to give an ALJ's findings the same deference as agency findings; it is
also unlikely that a court will give the same deference to an ALJ's in-
terpretation of an agency regulation that courts have given to agency
interpretations.1 5 Similarly, although courts have recognized the ex-
411. Id.
412. See Anderson v. Department of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 623 A.2d 198,
212-13 (Md. 1993) (discussing judicial review when agency and ALJ disagree).
413. See State Personnel Management System Reform Act of 1996, ch. 347, § 4-401, 1996
Md. Laws 2077, 2119. Governor William Donald Schaefer had twice vetoed bills granting
the OAH final decisional authority in most personnel cases; he believed the Department of
Personnel needed to retain final decisional authority in order to fulfill its responsibility to
set and enforce State personnel policy. See Veto Message of May 26, 1992, 1992 Md. Laws
4175; Veto Message of May 24, 1991, 1991 Md. Laws 3825.
414. Act of April 30, 1996, ch. 190, § 8-415(H), 1996 Md. Laws 1599, 1604. Prior to the
1996 amendments to that section, an ALJ sat with two educational specialists as part of a
three-person panel. Id. § 8-415(b) (5) (i), 1996 Md. Laws at 1602 (repealed 1996). The ALJ
now presides alone. Id. § 8-415(D)(1), 1996 Md. Laws at 1603.
415. The Court of Special Appeals, for example, has deferred to the expertise of the
Nursing Home Appeals Board (NHAB) in interpreting the Board's complex reimburse-
ment regulations. See Department of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Reeders Mem'l Home,
Inc., 586 A.2d 1295, 1299 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (reversing circuit court and remand-
ing with instructions to reinstate NHAB decision).
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pertise of agency staff that testify as witnesses,416 the present trend
favors using neutral, less adversarial experts.417 Perhaps the above de-
velopments are desirable, but one should realize that they favor inde-
pendence as a decisional value and take significant steps toward
eliminating the "agency" from agency adjudication. In many areas,
the OAH is becoming an administrative (nonjudicial) court for resolv-
ing disputes between private parties and state agencies; the agency,
rather than functioning as an adjudicator, participates as a party to
defend its determination.
41 8
The evolving role of the OAH as an administrative court raises a
final question: May the legislature assign the OAH the task of resolv-
ing disputes between private parties? The notion of a "contested"
case-an aggrieved party "contesting" an agency "determination"-
suggests a negative answer. In addition, a nonjudicial body's adjudica-
tion of tort, contract, or other private disputes most likely violates the
Separation of Powers provision in Maryland's Constitution.4 19 How-
ever, the Court of Appeals has recognized that an agency may grant
damages or other relief to private parties when that relief is "inciden-
tal, although reasonably necessary, to its regulatory powers."420 In
such cases, the agency's determination to grant relief to one private
party may be an appropriate basis for giving a contested case hearing
to another private party aggrieved by that determination. The legisla-
ture recently so provided with respect to Department of Natural Re-
sources determinations requiring surface mine owners to compensate
adjoining land owners for damage caused by dewatering or sink-
holes.421 According to the Court of Appeals, agency (and presumably
OAH) adjudication of a mine owner's liability does not violate separa-
416. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Department of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 602 A.2d 712,
714-15, 720 (Md. 1992) (upholding termination of prison guard based on security direc-
tor's testimony that guard's racist remarks outside of work indicated that he could poten-
tially spark a major prison disturbance).
417. The ALJ now has authority in special education cases to require an independent
examination of the student by an impartial expert wimess. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 8-
415(c) (iii) (Supp. 1995).
418. One check on this development is the APA provision that the OAH "is bound by
any agency regulation, declaratory ruling, prior adjudication, or settled pre-existing policy
to the same extent as the agency is or would have been if it were hearing the case." MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-214(b) (1995). This provision preserves the agencies' policy-
making role.
419. See Tomlinson, supra note 2, at 453 (discussing County Council v. Investors Funding
Corp., 312 A.2d 225 (Md. 1973)); see also supra note 302.
420. Investors Funding, 312 A.2d at 245-46.
421. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 15-813(c)(2) (1996).
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tion of powers if judicial review is available to aggrieved parties.42
Likewise, it appears to be constitutional for the legislature to grant an
insurance company a contested case hearing on the Maryland Insur-
ance Administration's determination that the insurer improperly can-
celled a policy holder.4 23 The Administration has delegated final
decisional authority in those cases to the OAH.4 24 Because the Ad-
ministration rarely participates as a party, the dispute is, as a practical
matter, between the insured and her insurance company. Nonjudicial
adjudication of what are in reality disputes between private parties
nevertheless appears appropriate if the agency, or the OAH, can pro-
vide more timely and economical decisions than the courts.425
C. What Is a Contested Case?
Describing the universe of contested cases in Maryland does not
tell us what is a contested case. The APA's definition of contested case
poses at least four distinct interpretive issues. First, what agency "de-
terminations" does it cover? Is there a category of "other" agency ac-
tion that does not constitute rulemaking, but also does not constitute
adjudication (and, therefore, cannot be a contested case) because the
agency is not determining anyone's "right, duty, statutory entitlement,
or privilege"?426 Second, when does a constitution (state or federal)
trigger contested case procedures? Must a constitution require a trial-
type hearing, or is it sufficient, under the Supreme Court's variable
due process approach, that a constitution require "some kind of hear-
ing"?127 Third, when does a statute (state or federal) trigger con-
tested case procedures? Do all statutory hearing rights qualify, or do
some statutory schemes negate the availability of a contested case
hearing? Fourth, who may invoke the APA's contested case proce-
422. See Maryland Aggregates Ass'n v. State, 655 A.2d 886, 894-97 (Md.), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1965 (1995) (upholding statute) (now codified at MD. CODE ANN., ENviR. § 15-
813(c) (2)).
423. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 240AA(f) (1994).
424. See Notice of delegation of hearing authority from Dwight K. Bartlett, III, Commis-
sioner, Maryland Insurance Administration (Oct. 2, 1995) (on file with author).
425. One significant category of cases decided by the OAH does appear to raise a consti-
tutional problem. By statute, a nursing home patient may obtain a hearing to challenge a
nursing home's decision to discharge or transfer the patient even though there is no
agency determination for the patient to contest. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-
345.1 (d) (1996). That section, as amended in 1995, provides that those hearings, although
to be conducted in accordance with the contested case subtitle, are not themselves con-
tested cases and that the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene may not be a party. Id.
§ 19-345.1(d) (3). The legislature has given final decisional authority in these cases to the
OAH. Id. § 19-345.1 (d)(4).
426. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(d)(1)(i) (1995).
427. See infra notes 447, 451.
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dures? Must the party seeking a contested case hearing be the party
whose license is at stake or whose rights or privileges the agency is
adjudicating? The definition of contested case is silent on this issue,
and the APA's judicial review provision does no more than provide
that "a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case
is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this
section. "428
Lurking behind all these questions is the hypothetical of the
camper aggrieved by the denial or revocation of a state camping per-
mit. What happened to the camper happens to countless persons
every day when park rangers or other state actors make decisions that
adversely affect private interests. Students receive low grades, or do
not make the football team; vehicles fail inspection; prisoners are
transferred to more secure facilities;job seekers are turned down; and
shopkeepers suffer business losses through road repairs, or the failure
to make them. Understandably, the aggrieved private party may wish
to contest the determination. In some of these situations, the legisla-
ture (by statute) or an agency (by regulation or informal practice)
may find it desirable to provide the aggrieved party a contested case
hearing to challenge the agency's determination. The legislature has
so provided with respect to most prisoner grievances.4 2 9 However, if
the legislature has not spoken, the agency should be able to deter-
mine that a contested case hearing is not warranted, either because
the interests at stake are not important enough or because trial-type
process is not appropriate for resolving the dispute.43 ° Treating all
these petty disputes as contested cases is impractical, if not absurd; it is
important that the APA give the courts sufficient flexibility to avoid
that result. Fortunately, as will be seen, that appears to be the case.
How to handle these disputes is a more difficult question, largely
beyond the scope of this Article. If the dispute is not a contested case,
the APA is inapplicable; the aggrieved party cannot invoke the Act's
provisions to contest the agency's determination. Of course, if some
fundamental right is at stake (if the camper claims that the park
ranger discriminated on the basis of race or other impermissible fac-
tor), the aggrieved party may bring a lawsuit in the courts. The lack of
428. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(a) (1).
429. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-102.1(e), (k) (1993).
430. Testing procedures are often more appropriate than trial-type process. See MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 11, § 14.08.13 (1995) (describing reinspection procedures for vehicles that
fail an emissions test).
[VOL. 56:196
1997] THE MARYLAND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
an administrative remedy does not affect the judicial remedy.431 In
addition, persons who believe they have been mistreated by insensitive
or error-prone agency officials may seek, with the aid of the media,
corrective action from higher officials at the agency, from elected offi-
cials, or from the courts.43 2 If the legislature finds those remedies to
be insufficient, it could amend the APA, as have the legislatures in
Washington and California, to provide more informal adjudicatory
procedures to resolve these disputes.433 The case for doing so re-
mains unproven.
Informal procedures are unlikely to satisfy the parties, or ade-
quately to resolve the dispute, if adjudicative facts are hotly contro-
verted. Informal notice and comment procedures may sometimes
prove effective, but their implementation should be left to agency dis-
cretion. For example, absent some evidence of abuse, the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources should be trusted to ensure that park
rangers do not revoke camping permits without giving the camper a
reason and an opportunity to respond. Affording informal process in
these situations may be sound administration, but APAs can only do so
much to ensure good government.
Turning to the first question raised by the definition of contested
case, there appears to be a category of other agency action that is
neither rulemaking nor adjudication. One example is an agency deci-
sion to initiate, or not initiate, an investigation, prosecution, or other
proceeding. Thus, the Human Relations Commission does not "adju-
dicate the rights or property of specific parties" when it makes a no
probable cause finding on a discrimination complaint.43 4 There is
also a range of administrative decisions that do not require adjudica-
tory procedures even though they might be viewed as particular rather
than general. These would include a decision to build or close a high-
way, to construct a state facility, or to relocate a university department.
431. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. CL 2342, 2347 (1996) (hold-
ing "government 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitu-
tionally protected . .. freedom of speech' even if he has no entitlement to that benefit"
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 596 (1972)) (alteration in original)).
432. See, e.g., Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church v. State Highway Admin., 350 A.2d 125,
128 (Md. 1976) (finding capricious blocking of access by closing beltway ramp reviewable
under courts' inherent power).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 225-234.
434. Parlato v. State Comm'n on Human Relations, 548 A.2d 144, 147 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1988) (where no probable cause found, dispute was not a contested case); see aLso
Eliason v. State Roads Comm'n, 189 A.2d 649, 651 (Md. 1963) (same). The 1981 Model
State APA explicitly provides that an agency need not conduct an adjudicative proceeding
when deciding whether to initiate or not to initiate an investigation, prosecution, or adju-
dicative proceeding. See 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33, § 4-101(a).
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These actions do not determine the legal rights of specific persons.435
For example, when the State Board of Education reviews a local
board's decision to close a school, it need not conduct a contested
case proceeding.4 6 The same result is likely if the Department of
Transportation closes a major bicycle route, even though a recently
enacted statute prohibits the Department from doing so unless it pro-
vides a reasonable alternative route.43 7 Once again, the agency's ac-
tion does not appear to determine the rights of specific parties.
For matters that are adjudicatory, questions two and three ask
whether constitutional or statutory provisions conferring hearing
rights are sufficient to trigger contested case procedures. Under the
Maryland APA's intermediate approach, the source of the hearing
right may be either constitutional or statutory.43 8 Equating constitu-
tionally based hearing rights and statutory hearing rights, rather than
limiting contested case procedures to adjudications where a statute
requires a hearing, poses at least two serious problems. First, it is
often extremely difficult to determine when the state or Federal Con-
stitution requires a hearing. Under the Supreme Court's present ap-
proach, due process requires notice and a hearing before a state can
deprive a person of a liberty or property interest;439 the Court of Ap-
peals has given the same "meaning" to due process under the state
constitution.' 40 Identifying liberty and property interests is not an
435. For a similar point, see Asimow, supra note 230, at 1090 n.73. Surprisingly, but
perhaps out of an abundance of caution, the legislature has provided that the hearing
required to be held on a change in use, purpose, or function of a state facility, or on the
acquisition of property by the state, is not a contested case hearing. MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOV'T § 8-306 (1995).
436. See, e.g., Elprin v. Howard County Bd. of Educ., 470 A.2d 833, 836 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1994) (holding no right or privilege to attend a particular school). In a similar case,
the Court of Appeals held that a county school board's redrawing of school districts was
legislative rather than adjudicative because the Board did not reassign students based on
"individual factors." Bernstein v. Board of Educ., 226 A.2d 243, 249 (Md. 1967).
437. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 8-601.1 (Supp. 1995). Under federal law, all agency
action is either rulemaking or adjudication; adjudication is the residual category. Thus,
the Department's action would be adjudicatory and reviewable by persons with standing.
See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (involv-
ing similar statute protecting parkland).
438. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(d)(i)-(ii); see supra text accompanying
notes 332-333.
439. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 n.7 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
440. See Department of Transp. v. Armacost (Armacost II), 474 A.2d 191, 203 (Md.
1984); Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 410 A.2d 1052, 1056 (Md. 1980); see also Patuxent Inst.
Bd. of Review v. Hancock, 620 A.2d 917, 922 n.7 (Md. 1993) (listing the Supreme Court's
criteria for due process protection under the Federal Constitution in describing due pro-
cess protection under the federal and state constitutions).
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easy task in the context of the regulatory state. Agencies grant many
permits and make many determinations that affect private interests.
How does one determine when those actions deprive persons of pro-
tected interests in liberty or property? What appears to be controlling
is the presence of standards that restrict an agency's discretion, thus
giving rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement." 1
The application of this vague test poses more difficulties than
does its formulation. The problem is in part one of federalism. Take,
for example, the landowner seeking to develop her property. Can the
owner claim a property interest in the permission or license required
for such development? The federal courts have held that any "signifi-
cant discretion conferred upon the local agency defeats the claim of a
property interest." "' That demanding test makes it difficult for the
landowner to establish a property interest, which is exactly what the
federal courts intend. As explained by the Fourth Circuit: "Resolving
the routine land-use disputes that inevitably and constantly arise
among developers, local residents, and municipal officials is simply
not the business of the federal courts."" 3
Federal courts, therefore, define narrowly liberty and property to
avoid unwarranted intervention in matters of state and local concern.
State courts, however, face no such constraints, but also have no need
to base their decisions explicitly on the Constitution. For example,
the Court of Appeals has made quite clear that a landowner seeking a
special use exemption has the right to a fair hearing before the local
441. See Scs-wARTz, supra note 46, § 5.18, at 264-66 (property interests). The Court re-
cently abandoned this approach as a basis for defining the liberty interests of prisoners. It
is no longer sufficient for the creation of an entitlement that statutes or prison regulations
limit the discretion of prison officials. See Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299-30
(1995) (stating that "atypical and significant hardship" is required for deprivation of pris-
oner's federal liberty interest).
442. Gardner v. City of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Spence v.
Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that owners of a partially fin-
ished house had no protected property interest in temporary certificate of occupancy be-
cause the city was given discretion in its issuance); RRI Realty Corp. v. Incorporated
Village, 870 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1989) (denying plaintiffs claim that the denial of a
building permit violated substantive due process because the village authority had been
granted wide discretion in approving building permits); Carolan v. City of Kansas City, 813
F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that appellants were not denied a protected prop-
erty interest in a temporary occupancy certificate because they had not complied with
proper procedural prerequisites); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927
F.2d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff did not possess a property interest
in a public works agreement permitting development of proposed subdivision because
state and municipal law accorded the city discretion to refuse to issue the agreement)).
443. Id. at 67.
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zoning authorities.'8 Not surprisingly, the court speaks in common
law terms rather than explicitly holding that the landowner has a con-
stitutionally protected property interest in a special use exemption." 5
As a result, there is a shortage of state case law on when the state or
Federal Constitution requires a hearing. Federal case law is more
abundant, but it is often inappropriate to treat it as controlling be-
cause federalism values encourage federal courts to define narrowly
liberty and property." 6 State courts should not hesitate to protect a
broader range of interests under the state constitution; the Court of
Appeals should, therefore, reconsider its acceptance of federal prece-
dent defining liberty and property interests.
The second, and more serious, problem with the Constitution as
a source of hearing rights derives from the Supreme Court's variable
due process approach. Under that approach, the type of process due
depends on a utilitarian balancing of the interests at stake. Hearings
required by the Constitution, therefore, take many forms."47 If the
private interest at stake is considerable, and the facts in dispute are
adjudicative, due process may require trial-type process-the
equivalent of contested case procedures. An example might be the
removal of a civil servant for misconduct." 8 If, however, the private
interest at stake is less significant, and the governmental interest in a
prompt decision is considerable, more informal procedures satisfy
due process. The classic example is the "corridor hearing" that the
principal or other school disciplinarian must afford before imposing a
444. See Harford County v. Earl E. Preston,Jr., Inc., 588 A.2d 772, 778 (Md. 1991) (hold-
ing board's failure to follow zoning code violated "fundamental right" to administrative
proceeding and judicial review); see also Schultz v. Pritts, 432 A.2d 1319, 1323-24 (Md.
1981) (discussing discretionary power of administrative body to grant rehearings).
445. See Preston, 558 A.2d at 778 (recognizing a "fundamental right"); Schultz, 432 A.2d at
1327 (discussing adverse effect on adjoining landowners). For a recent decision on special
use exemptions invoking more explicitly constitutional terms, see Mossburg v. Montgomery
County, 666 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), cert. denied 672 A.2d 623 (Md.
1996). The Fourth Circuit has held that a landowner has no federally protected property
right in a special use exemption. See Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir.
1993) ("[T]he proper forum for local land-use disputes is state, not federal, court.").
446. See Gardner, 969 F.2d at 68 ("[F]ederal courts should be extremely reluctant to up-
set the delicate political balance at play in local land-use disputes.").
447. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). Under Mathews, the fac-
tors the court must balance are (a) the private interests affected; (b) the risk of an errone-
ous determination through the process afforded and the probable value of added
procedural safeguards; and (c) the public interest in avoiding the cost and delay of addi-
tional procedures. Id.; see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980) (review-
ing three factors cited in Mathews).
448. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) ("[A]n individ-
ual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property
interest." (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971))).
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short suspension on a high school student for misconduct.' 9 The dis-
ciplinarian must provide the student with notice and an opportunity
to explain, but may do so orally immediately after observing the al-
leged misconduct.450 The Constitution requires "some kind of hear-
ing"45 ' before the school sends the student home, but does not
require the full panoply of due process protections.
The Constitution, if treated as a source of hearing rights under
the APA, may, therefore, require agencies to use contested case proce-
dures whenever due process requires some kind of hearing. That re-
suit-requiring contested case hearings where less formal procedures
are both appropriate and constitutional-may produce inefficiencies.
Such a mismatch is avoidable in statutorily required hearings. If the
legislature believes that trial-type procedures are appropriate, it
should specify, as has the Maryland legislature on numerous occa-
sions, that the agency afford notice and an opportunity for a hearing
in accordance with the contested case subtitle of the APA.452 If, how-
ever, the legislature believes that some kind of less formal hearing is
appropriate, it may statutorily require whatever hearing procedures it
finds appropriate. If the legislature thus negates the availability of
APA contested case procedures, the statute and agency regulations
will provide the procedures that govern adjudications. The legislature
can even provide that the OAH adjudicate these "noncontested"
cases, as it did recently for proceedings to correct child abuse and
neglect records.453
Treating all cases in which the Constitution requires a hearing as
contested cases thus generates both uncertainty as to coverage and an
overuse of trial-type procedures. These problems are less serious if an
agency must use contested case procedures only when the Constitu-
tion requires a trial-type or evidentiary hearing. The new California
APA explicitly so provides.454 Under that Act, an agency must con-
duct a formal APA hearing if the state or Federal Constitution re-
quires "an evidentiary hearing for determination of facts."4 55 If a less
449. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (concluding need to ensure efficient
operation of schools does not mean school administrators are totally free from notice and
hearing requirements).
450. See id.
451. The phrase, borrowed by Judge Friendly for his classic pre-Mathews article on varia-
ble due process, Friendly, supra note 223, at 1267, comes fromJustice White's opinion for
the Court in Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
452. See supra note 368.
453. See C.S. v. Prince George's County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 680 A.2d 470, 473 (Md.
1996).
454. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11410.10 (West 1996).
455. Id.
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formal hearing satisfies due process, the formal APA hearing proce-
dures do not apply.456 The Court of Special Appeals interpreted the
Maryland APA to reach the same result in Angell v. Henneberny.4 57 The
court held that a decision by the Patuxent Institution (a special treat-
ment facility) to transfer an inmate to the Division of Correction was
not a contested case, even though, under prevailing Supreme Court
precedent, the inmate had a due process right to a hearing.45 Ac-
cording to the Court of Special Appeals, the constitutionally required
hearing was less "formal" or "structured" then the adversarial, trial-
type hearing that "generally characterizes a contested case."4"9 Under
due process principles, the prisoner had only a limited right to call
witnesses and no right to confront or cross-examine Patuxent's wit-
nesses." ° These limitations were, in the Angell court's opinion, "at
odds" with the rights conferred on the parties in a contested case to
call witnesses and to cross-examine opposing witnesses. 6  The pris-
oner's due process right to an informal hearing was, therefore, insuffi-
cient to trigger more formal contested case procedures. 46 2
The Angell court reaches a sensible result by recognizing that the
informal nature of the constitutionally required process may negate
contested case procedures.46 3 The decision, however, creates at least
456. See id. § 11410.10 cmt. (citing examples of informal processes to which the APA
does not apply).
457. 607 A.2d 590 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
458. Id. at 600-02. The Angell court found that the inmate had a liberty interest at stake
because explicit statutory language restricted Patuxent's discretion to transfer to the Divi-
sion of Correction prisoners previously found eligible to receive Patuxent's services. Id. at
598. That holding most likely does not survive Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). See
supra note 441.
459. Angell, 607 A.2d at 602. The principal Supreme Court precedent relied on was
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), regarding prison disciplinary proceedings.
460. Angel/. 607 A.2d at 602.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id. The Angell court's reasoning would ensure that campers evicted from state
parks would not receive contested case hearings. Even if the Department of Natural Re-
sources's regulations could be construed to create a liberty or property interest (an un-
likely occurrence because a ranger may revoke a camping permit without giving a reason,
MD. REGS. CODE tit. 8, § 07.06.08B (1995)), the camper, like the suspended student in Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), would be constitutionally entitled to no more than an infor-
mal "campsite" hearing.
However, statutory provisions governing inmate grievances give inmates with far less at
stake than Angell the opportunity for a contested case hearing before the OAH. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-102.1 (e), (k) (1993). Special procedural regulations govern those
hearings, see MD. REGs. CODE tit. 12, § 07.01 (Inmate Grievance Office), but inmates enjoy
the right to retained counsel-the right which the Court of Special Appeals held that Pa-
tuxent could deny the inmate in AngelL Angell, 607 A.2d at 602.
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one major problem.61 Excluding an adjudication from the APA's
contested case subtitles also excludes the agency's final decision from
the APA's judicial review provision. That result is unfortunate. The
Federal APA, in contrast, subjects both formal and informal adjudica-
tion to judicial review.465 Legitimating agency action through the
availability of APA review is particularly important when the agency
conducts an informal adjudication by constitutional compulsion,
rather than as an exercise of discretion. Perhaps the courts can en-
sure the necessary procedural regularity under inherent power review,
but it would seem preferable for the legislature to make all constitu-
tionally required adjudicatory hearings reviewable under the APA.
Similar questions arise in determining what statutory hearing
rights trigger contested case procedures. Is it sufficient that a statute
requires some kind of hearing, or must there be a close fit between
the nature of the heating required and the trial-type process afforded
by the APA? On this issue, the Court of Appeals, in Sugarloaf Citizens
Ass'n v. Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority," 6 did not require a
particularly tight fit, holding that a statutory requirement of a "public
hearing" suffices unless something in the statutory scheme "expressly
or by implication negates a contested case hearing."" 7 The legisla-
ture promptly overturned that decision, amending the APA to provide
that a requirement for a "public hearing" does not trigger contested
case procedures unless the statute expressly so provides." 8 The legis-
464. There is also a problem in determining whether the Constitution requires a trial-
type or evidentiary hearing rather than some less formal hearing. An interesting example
of this phenomenon is the adjudication of employee claims for accidental disability bene-
fits. In 1980, the Attorney General, in a rare confession of impotence, concluded that he
was unable to reach, on the information available to him, an "informed judgment" on
whether the Federal Constitution gave an employee a right to a trial-type hearing in a
dispute over pension benefits. See 65 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 461, 466-70 (1980). Despite this
uncertainty, the agency treats these proceedings as contested cases. See Courtney v. Board
of Trustees, 402 A.2d 885, 886-87 (Md. 1979) (describing agency's procedures in that
case). See supra note 383 for the present regulations.
465. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
466. 594 A.2d 1115 (Md. 1991).
467. Id. at 1127 (on denial of reconsideration).
468. Act of April 13, 1993, ch. 59, § 10-203(c), 1993 Md. Laws, 1017, 1024, codified at MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-203(c) (1995). That amendment reads:
(c) A public hearing required or provided for by statute or regulation before an
agency takes a particular action is not an agency hearing under § 10-202(d) of
this subtitle (defining a contested case] unless the statute or regulation:
1) expressly requires that the public hearing be held in accordance with this sub-
title; or
2) expressly requires that any judicial review of the agency determination follow-
ing the public hearing be conducted in accordance with this subtitle.
Id. § 10-203(c).
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lature, however, limited the effect of this general provision when it
amended the Environment Article to afford a contested case hearing
on most, if not all, significant environmental permit determina-
tions.46 9 The Sugarloaf saga is also worth recounting for its insights
into who are the parties to a contested case hearing-the fourth ques-
tion of interpretation raised by the definition of contested case-and
the consequences of granting a contested case hearing to persons
whose rights, or licenses, are not at stake.
In Sugarloaf Montgomery County and the Northeast Maryland
Waste Disposal Authority applied to the Maryland Department of the
Environment (MDE) for a permit to locate a solid waste incinerator in
a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) area.47° The PSD per-
mit was the first of three required permits.471 No statute required the
MDE to hold a hearing before granting or denying the permit applica-
tion, but an MDE regulation did require the applicants to publish a
newspaper advertisement informing the public of their right to re-
quest a "public hearing" on the application and to submit "written
comments" to which the agency had an obligation to respond.472
However, a statute required the agency, before issuing the second re-
quired permit (the construction permit), to give public notice and to
provide "an opportunity for a public hearing in the county in which
the proposed source will be located."47 The agency regulation imple-
menting that hearing right required public notice by newspaper ad-
vertisement, a "public hearing" on written request, and an agency
response to all written comments.474
The Sugarloaf Citizens Association, a nonprofit corporation rep-
resenting the interests of area residents, and two individual landown-
ers requested that the MDE hold a contested case hearing on the PSD
permit.47 5 When the MDE denied that request, Sugarloaf and the
landowners soughtjudicial relief.4 76 In the Court of Appeals, they lost
the battle but won the war. The court held that the regulatory hear-
469. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 1-601 to -606 (1996); see infra text accompanying notes
509-512.
470. Sugarloaf 594 A.2d at 1118.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 1121 n.9 (referring to MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 11.02.10C).
473. Id. at 1122 (referring to MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 2-404(b)).
474. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 11.02.10C. That regulation (now repealed) was also the
source of the public hearing required on PSD permit applications. See supra note 472.
Under the regulation, the state hearing process was the same for PSD and construction
permit applications. See 13:18 Md. Reg. 2053, 2054 (1986) (proposing what became MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 11.02.10C); 14:4 Md. Reg. 419 (1987) (adoption of same).
475. Sugaroaf 594 A.2d at 1118.
476. Id. at 1118-19.
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ing on the PSD application was not a contested case hearing, but that
the statutory hearing on the construction permit was such a hear-
ing.477 According to the court: "Under the air quality permit scheme
as a whole, the State has chosen the construction permit approval
stage as the point at which a hearing is required by law, thus meeting
the definition of a contested case."4 78
Sugarloaf s holding on the construction permit issue is unconvinc-
ing if one assumes, as did the court, that not all statutory hearing
rights trigger contested case procedures. The statutory hearing ap-
pears to have been a legislative-type hearing, ensuring community res-
idents input in the permit-issuing process. The procedures specified
in the agency's implementing regulations confirm this impression;
parties to a contested case do not receive notice through newspaper
advertisements, nor does the agency respond to all written comments
received.479 Under prevailing federal law, the agency's interpretation
would probably control on the issue of what type of hearing its en-
abling statute required.4"' In rejecting the agency's interpretation,
the Sugarloaf court reasoned, rather formalistically, that a "public
hearing" was nevertheless a "hearing."481 The court also insisted that
the APA's definition of a contested case was controlling; therefore, it
did not matter whether the external statutory source "uses language
indicating that the hearing is adjudicatory."482 Under this approach,
which emphasizes the generic nature of the word "hearing" found in
the definition, any statutory hearing right would trigger the applicabil-
ity of contested case procedures. However, the court then contra-
dicted itself when it recognized that something in a statutory scheme
might, expressly or impliedly, "negate" a contested case hearing.4" 3
477. Id. at 1122-23.
478. Id. at 1122. In a lengthy opinion denying the State's motion for reconsideration,
Judge Eldridge, again speaking for the Sugarloaf court, rejected the State's argument that
the court's addressing the construction permit issue was unnecessary for the disposition of
the case. Id. at 1124-31.
479. In proposing the regulation, the agency (then the Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene) identified the purpose of the regulation as providing "the public an op-
portunity to request a public hearing before the Department." 13:18 Md. Reg. 2053, 2054
(1986) (emphasis added).
480. See Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(adopting as reasonable the agency's interpretation that a statutory hearing right did not
require formal adjudication). The court applied the Supreme Court's Chevron doctrine,
Chevron U.SA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to
hold that the agency's position was based on a "permissible construction of the statute."
Chemical Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1480.
481. Sugarloaf 594 A.2d at 1122 n.12.
482. Id. at 1126 (on denial of reconsideration).
483. Id. at 1121; see also id. at 1127 (on denial of reconsideration).
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Despite the legislative history and the agency's implementing regula-
tions, the court found nothing to "negate" contested case hearings on
construction permit applications; it reacted quite differently to the
agency regulation that required hearings on PSD permit applications.
That regulation, according to the court, negated contested case status
for the hearing because the regulation authorized the agency to sub-
stitute EPA informal hearing procedures for state hearingprocedures. 4s
The Sugarloaf opinion also leaves unexplained why the adjoining
landowners may obtain a contested case hearing on the construction
permit application. For a proceeding to be a contested case, an
agency must determine either a "right, duty, statutory entitlement, or
privilege of a person" or "the grant, denial, renewal, revocation, sus-
pension, or amendment of a license."4 5 It appears that the MDE was
determining the "right" or "privilege" of the applicants to construct
the facility, and it was most certainly determining whether to grant
them a license. In fact, the agency's regulations allowed an applicant
to request a contested case hearing if the permit was denied. 4 6 Ironi-
cally, the applicants whose rights, and certainly whose license, were at
stake not only did not request, but actively resisted, a contested case
hearing." 7 The landowners requesting the hearing were in a differ-
ent situation. Although they alleged that the incinerator would di-
minish the value of their property and adversely affect their health, it
does not appear that the MDE was determining their rights or deny-
ing them a license or other permission. *s Their situation appears
484. Id. at 1122-23.
485. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-202(d) (1) (i)-(ii) (1995).
486. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, § 11.02.12 (repealed on May 8, 1995, 22:9 Md. Reg. 648
(1995)). That provision derived from Maryland's original air quality regulations. See MD.
REGS. CODE tit. 10, § 18.02.03J, reprinted in 7:5 Md. Reg. 500, 511 (1980). The present
regulations, MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, §§ 11.02.01 to -21 (1996), implement the new Public
Participation subtitle of the Environment Article; see infra text accompanying notes 509-
512.
487. Sugarloaf, 594 A.2d at 1119.
488. Under federal law, generalized health, safety, and environmental concerns do not
constitute liberty or property interests. See City of W. Chicago v. United States Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632, 645 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing those interests not
subject to due process protection). Similarly, a landowner does not have a property inter-
est in another person's land use merely because that use may adversely affect the market
value of the landowner's property. See Mehta v. Surles, 905 F.2d 595, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1990)
(licensing of community residence for mentally retarded does not deprive neighbors of
any constitutionally cognizable property interest); Woodward & Lothrop, Inc. v. Neall, 813
F. Supp. 1158, 1160 (D. Md. 1993) (adjacent property owner (a competitor) has no consti-
tutionally protected property interest in preventing expansion of mall). Finally, the MDE's
licensing of the incinerator does not affect any rights the landowners may have under the
law of nuisance or inverse condemnation. See Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v.
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analogous to that of the pharmacists in the subsequent case of Weiner
v. Maryland Insurance Administration.489 Although the Administration's
approval of a Blue Cross/Blue Shield filing certainly aggrieved the
pharmacists, the court held that they were not entitled to a contested
case hearing because the agency had not determined their "rights."490
Persons in the landowners' position are familiar figures in federal
administrative law, where they operate as "private Attorneys Gen-
eral."49 To qualify as a private Attorney General, one must establish
some injury in fact, but the injury that establishes one's standing as an
aggrieved person need not affect any right.492 Private Attorneys Gen-
eral, therefore, do not represent their own interests, but "have stand-
ing only as representatives of the public interest."49 Under the broad
federal law of standing, private Attorneys General may obtain review
of agency action and intervene in ongoing agency proceedings.494
More important, they may also force an agency to initiate an adjudica-
tory proceeding. For example, in the seminal case of Office of Commu-
nications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,495 aggrieved listeners
convinced the court to order a formal Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) adjudicatory hearing on a broadcast license renewal
after the agency had granted the application without a hearing.496
Maryland's APA recognizes the standing of "a party who is ag-
grieved by a final decision in a contested case" to obtain judicial re-
view of that decision, 497 but is silent on standing to intervene or to
initiate a contested case hearing. The Court of Appeals, addressing
standing, has interpreted the APA to require that a party establish "a
CAE-Link Corp., 622 A.2d 745, 752-53 (Md. 1993) (concluding state's grant of permission
was not a defense for nuisance action). Given this case law, it is hard to identify any rights
of the landowners adjudicated by the agency.
489. 652 A.2d 125 (Md. 1995).
490. Id. at 130.
491. That much-quoted phrase derives fromJudgeJerome Frank's opinion in Associated
Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir.), vacated, 320 U.S. 707
(1943).
492. FCC v. Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940) (holding that existing licensee may
challenge licensing of competitor even though no right to be free from competition).
493. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
494. Federal courts tend to equate standing to obtain judicial review and standing to
intervene. See SclwrARTz, supra note 46, § 6.1, at 294.
495. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
496. Id. at 1009. The agency had granted a probationary renewal, id. at 999, which the
applicant had accepted.
In a leading environmental permitting case, a private Attorney General forced the
EPA to hold a formal adjudicatory proceeding on the grant of a discharge permit. See
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 874-75 (1st Cir. 1978).
497. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(a)(1) (1995).
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specific interest or property right . personally and specifically af-
fected in a way different from that suffered by the public generally."498
This test for defining "aggrieved" is more demanding than federal
standing doctrine,499 but does not appear to require the deprivation
of a right; a showing of special damage should suffice °.5 0 The test for
standing to intervene in an ongoing contested case should be no
more restrictive because, under the Maryland APA, only an aggrieved
person who is also party to a contested case may obtain judicial review
of the final decision.5 0' However, standing to initiate a contested case
proceeding raises additional concerns because of the extra burden it
imposes on the agency and the other parties. Forcing an agency to
conduct an unwanted hearing is surely more burdensome than requir-
ing that a new party be accommodated in an ongoing proceeding.
For this reason, the 1981 Model State APA does not require an agency
to initiate an adjudicative proceeding at the request of a private Attor-
ney General.50 ' To obtain an adjudicative proceeding, an applicant
must establish that "the applicant's legal rights, duties, privileges, immu-
nities, or other legal interests are to be determined by the requested
order."50 3 Under that approach, the landowners in Sugarloaf most
likely would not have obtained a contested case hearing.
The Sugarloaf court, although not deciding whether the landown-
ers had standing, framed the issue in terms of their standing to obtain
judicial review of the MDE permit.50 4 Evidently, the court did not per-
498. Medical Waste Assocs., Inc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc., 612 A.2d 241, 248 n.9
(Md. 1992) (quoting Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 230 A.2d 289, 294
(Md. 1966)). According to the Medical Waste Associates court, the APA requirement of ag-
grievement "mirrors general common law standing principles." Medical Waste Assocs., 612
A.2d at 248 n.9.
499. While federal law requires the party claiming standing to be among the persons
injured by agency action, there is no requirement that the injury suffered be different than
that suffered by others. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972) (discussing
requirements of standing). In addition, federal law allows organizations to represent the
interests of their members, Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
342-43 (1977) (discussing prerequisites to "associational standing"), while Maryland law
requires an organization to establish a "property interest of its own-separate and distinct
from that of its members." Citizens Planning & Hous. Ass'n v. County Executive, 329 A.2d
681, 687 (Md. 1974).
500. See Biyniarski, 230 A.2d at 294 ("[Hie is personally and specially affected in a way
different from that suffered by the public generally.").
501. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-222(a)(1).
502. See 1981 MSAPA, supra note 33, § 4-102(b) (4).
503. Id. § 4-102(b) (4) cmt. The Model Act has a separate provision on intervention as
of right in an ongoing formal adjudication. See id. § 4-209(a).
504. Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Northeast Md. Waste Disposal Auth., 594 A.2d 1115,
1119 n.6 (Md. 1991). Peculiarly, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, in light of its decision
that the proceeding was a contested case, it did not need to reach the issue of the landown-
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ceive the issue to be one of standing to intervene. 5  In a subsequent
case involving a similar MDE decision, the Court of Appeals did de-
cide the standing issue when it held that an association did not have
standing to obtain judicial review of the agency's decision to grant the
permit.50 6 The court treated the proceeding as a contested case, but
mentioned neither the agency's failure to conduct a contested case
hearing nor the association's standing to compel the agency to do so.
Both the APA and case law thus leave unaddressed who has standing
to intervene. The Court of Appeals's confusing analysis evidently led
the Attorney General to conclude that "members of the public" op-
posing a landfill permit application were entitled to a contested case
hearing, but that only persons "aggrieved" by the agency's decision to
grant the permit could obtain judicial review under the APA.5 °7 That
result is unfortunate; trial-type process to challenge agency action
should not be available to all comers, but only to persons who would
be injured in some fashion by the agency's determination.
The legislature, with the aid of the Tiburzi Commission, provided
a more appropriate response to Sugarloaf The first part of that re-
sponse defined "public hearing" to overturn Sugarloaf s holding that a
statutory right to a "public hearing" was a sufficient trigger.50 8 Sec-
ond, and more important, the legislature added a new subtitle on
Public Participation in the Permitting Process to the Environment Ar-
ticle.50 9 That process, which applies to most MDE permit determina-
tions,510 includes informational meetings and public hearings on
permit applications; it also grants a contested case hearing to persons
ers' standing to bring this action. Id. That reasoning is peculiar, not only because it sug-
gests that it is appropriate to decide the merits before resolving the standing issue, but
because it seems to assume that the only standing issue before the court was the standing
of the landowners to obtain judicial review of the permit determination.
505. But see id. at 1124-25 (on denial of reconsideration) (stating the court was not de-
ciding whether the landowners had standing to obtain a contested case hearing). The
MDE subsequently granted the permit after a contested case hearing in which the land-
owners participated. Sugarloaf Citizens' Ass'n v. Department of the Env't, 653 A.2d 506,
508 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994), cert. granted, 661 A.2d 733 (Md. 1995). Applying the
Bryniarski test, the Court of Special Appeals held that the landowners did not have standing
to obtain review of that decision under the Maryland APA. Id. at 511.
506. See Medical Waste Assocs., Inc. v. Maryland Waste Coalition, Inc., 612 A.2d 241, 249-
50 (Md. 1992). While the Medical Waste Associates court held that the administrative pro-
ceeding under review was a contested case, id. at 246, the agency had not conducted a
contested case hearing.
507. See 78 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 93-045, 273, 276 (Nov. 8, 1993).
508. MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 10-203(c) (1995) (public hearings); see also supra
note 468 (text of amendment).
509. MD. CODE ANN., ErMR. §§ 1-601 to -606 (1996).
510. See id. § 2-404 (air quality construction permits); § 9-209 (landfill permits); § 9-323
(discharge permits-water); §§ 9-234, -238 (sewage sludge permits); §§ 7-103, -232 (con-
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"aggrieved" by the MDE's final determination.1 Thus, while over-
turning the Sugarloaf court's interpretation of "public hearing," the
legislature reached the same result; it classified adjudications granting
or denying air quality and most other environmental permits as con-
tested cases. This reflects a healthy trend whereby the legislature ad-
dresses explicitly, in delegating adjudicatory authority, whether the
agency must afford an opportunity for a contested case hearing and to
whom that opportunity must be afforded.512
The new public participation subtitle of the Environment Article
contains special provisions designed to make contested case proce-
dures more manageable for environmental cases.513 Although not
part of the APA, these provisions (at least in their intent) resemble the
Federal APA's provisions allowing an agency to use less formal proce-
dures for initial licensing and ratemaking.514 The concern is the same
in both instances: the mismatch between trial-type procedures and
initial licensing. Trial-type procedures may become unmanageable,
given the predictive and policy component of much initial licensing
and the efforts of adversely affected persons to prolong the proceed-
ing.51 5 The resulting delay may be more harmful to the public inter-
trolled hazardous substance facility permits); § 7-233 (low-level nuclear waste facility
permits).
511. Id. § 1-605.
512. In 1994 the legislature explicitly required contested case procedures for permitting
proceedings transferred to the MDE from the Department of Natural Resources. Id. § 5-
204(f) (applicable to water appropriation permits, nontidal wetlands permits, oil and gas
permits, mining permits, and most private wetlands permits).
513. See id. § 1-605(a)-(e) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 516-518).
514. For a description of the federal provisions, see supra text accompanying notes 207-
211.
515. That concern led the Attorney General to advise the Secretary of Health and
Mental Hygiene to approve group home applications for the developmentally disabled
without notice and hearing once the agency determined that the application was in com-
pliance with regulatory guidelines. See 78 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 93-030, 169, 169 (July 30,
1993). The Attorney General had previously advised the secretary that the hearing re-
quired by statute was legislative and that providing community residents an evidentiary
hearing would have "discriminatory effects prohibited by federal law." 75 Md. Op. Att'y
Gen. 90-014, 101, 112 (Mar. 7, 1990). For the applicable federal law, see Potomac Group
Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1295-97, 1299 (D. Md. 1993) (invalidat-
ing county's licensing procedures for group homes).
Similar concerns prompted the legislature to modify or eliminate contested case pro-
cedures for the granting of certificates of need by the Health Resources Planning Commis-
sion. See the Health Care Reform Act of 1995, ch. 499, 1995 Md. Laws 2865 (largely
codified at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-118 (Supp. 1995)). As explained by the
Commission, the protracted nature of the contested case process had caused it to conduct
50 days of evidentiary hearings in 1994 and 1995. See 22:17 Md. Reg. 1347 (1995) (propos-
ing regulations to implement the 1995 Act).
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est than a more timely regulatory approval using less formal
procedures.
To expedite the permitting process, the Environment Article's
public participation subtitle contains time limits for scheduling the
required informational meetings and public hearings on permit appli-
cations5 16 Upon the completion of that process, only aggrieved per-
sons may obtain a contested case hearing on the MDE's
determination to grant or deny a permit, and they must allege with
"sufficient particularity" both the basis for their aggrievement and the
legal and factual bases for challenging the determination.517 If the
allegations are insufficient, the MDE shall dismiss the request for a
contested case hearing; if the MDE grants a contested case hearing,
the ALJ has express authority to decide the case summarily if there is
no genuine dispute as to the material facts.518 Although these provi-
sions allow aggrieved persons to initiate contested case proceedings
and leave the definition of "aggrieved" to the courts, they should allow
the agency to obtain an early determination of the standing issue. In
Sugarloaf, the courts held that the granting of the construction permit
was a contested case without addressing whether the landowners had
standing.51 9 As a result, the OAH held fifteen days of hearings at the
behest of a party subsequently found to lack standing.52 ° Surely, an
agency should be able to avoid conducting a trial-type hearing if it
believes, and is able to establish in court, that the only party seeking
the hearing lacks standing.
CONCLUSION
The Maryland APA has well served its intended function of legiti-
mating agency lawmaking and adjudication. During its forty-year life,
the Act has furthered the values of transparency, procedural regular-
ity, and judicial review. As a result, Marylanders have less to fear from
the administrative state than they would without the APA.
Perhaps Maryland's APA could do more to further these values if
the legislature removed the Act's principal limitations. The legisla-
ture could apply the APA to agencies now exempt from its provisions,
subject regulations to rationality review, create procedures for infor-
mal adjudication, and make all adjudicatory actions reviewable under
516. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 1-605(a).
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. See supra notes 504-505 and accompanying text.
520. Sugarloaf Citizens' Ass'n v. Department of the Env't, 653 A.2d 506, 508 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1994), cert. granted, 661 A.2d 733 (Md. 1995).
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the APA. Those changes would bring Maryland's APA in line with the
Federal APA and the 1981 Model State APA. Although 1997 does not
seem a propitious time for revision, such changes may occur in the
future. However, there are strong arguments for retaining the APA's
limitations. Exemptions for particular agencies permit a greater role
for agency expertise in highly specialized areas; judicial review of reg-
ulations for rationality might further ossify the rulemaking process;
informal procedures are not appropriate for resolving disputed issues
of adjudicative fact; and the courts' inherent review power does serve
as a check on most informal adjudication. The status quo on these
matters is, therefore, acceptable, although legislators and scholars
should revisit these issues in future years. However, the legislature
should consider exempting nonlegislative regulations from rulemak-
ing procedures and facilitating agency efforts to modify proposed reg-
ulations in light of public comment; both would lighten agencies'
rulemaking burden. The modesty of these proposed reforms further
demonstrates that Maryland's APA is working well.
272 [VOL. 56:196
